University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
Spring 2020

Operational Drivers of Hospital and Physician Adaptation to
Industry Change
Justin Taylor Kistler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Kistler, J. T.(2020). Operational Drivers of Hospital and Physician Adaptation to Industry Change.
(Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5883

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

OPERATIONAL DRIVERS OF HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN ADAPTATION TO
INDUSTRY CHANGE
by
Justin Taylor Kistler
Bachelor of Science
Clemson University, 2005
Master of Business Administration
Wake Forest University, 2012

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Business Administration
Darla Moore School of Business
University of South Carolina
2020
Accepted by:
Mark Ferguson, Major Professor
Luv Sharma, Major Professor
Manoj Malhotra, Committee Member
Carrie Queenan, Committee Member
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

© Copyright by Justin Taylor Kistler, 2020
All Rights Reserved.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to acknowledge and extend gratitude to dissertation
advisers Mark Ferguson and Luv Sharma, committee members Manoj Malhotra and
Carrie Queenan, as well as the faculty, staff, and doctoral students of the Management
Science department at the Darla Moore School of Business. This work would not be
possible without the continued guidance and support of these individuals.

iii

ABSTRACT
Hospitals and physicians are often required to adapt their operations in response
to macro changes in their industry environment. This dissertation examines the
operational factors which influence and incentivize changes in hospital and physician
operating performance. The first essay in this dissertation investigates how legislative
political support and competition in the area in which a hospital operates influences
hospitals’ investments and commitment to complying with performance mandates
implemented by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) legislation in the
United States. Leveraging United States hospital performance data from 2007 to 2014,
results indicate a differential impact of government ideology on recently introduced
patient experience metrics versus traditional clinical metrics. These findings contribute to
the research regarding the impact of firms’ operating environments on the effectiveness
of industry policy adoption, particularly in situations where future uncertainty of existing
legislative mandates is high.
The second essay in this dissertation focuses on the unintended impacts to
physician opioid prescribing behavior created by the passage of the ACA. This study
aims to enhance our understanding of the factors associated with opioid prescription
behavior and provide prescriptive insights to reduce opioid prescribing, which serves as
the principal gateway to opioid addiction. Specifically, this study examines how
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prescriber workload, introduction of the Value Based Purchasing (VBP) program,
and market competition influence opioid prescribing. Results demonstrate an increase in
opioid prescription rates following the introduction of the VBP program, along with a
moderating impact of prescriber workload and market competition on opioid prescription
rates. These findings inform the discussion on the health and societal impacts of the
opioid epidemic in the United States, while providing prescriptive implications to
hospital managers, prescribers and policymakers about the influence of operational and
competitive factors on opioid prescription rates. Together, these studies provide empirical
support for the influence of operational factors on hospital and physician responses to
environmental changes in the US healthcare industry.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 drastically altered
the United States healthcare industry, ushering in sweeping changes aimed at
transforming the US healthcare industry from a fee-for-service to a pay-for-performance
environment (Werner et al. 2011). Among the many policy changes included within the
ACA were reimbursement programs designed to financially incentivize hospitals and
physicians to modify their operating behavior towards a focus on improving clinical and
experiential quality. Shifting towards a new payment model required hospitals to invest a
significant amount of nonrecoverable financial and human resources to maintain
compliance with new regulations, particularly with regard to non-traditional performance
measures (Merlino and Raman 2013, Levinson et al. 2010).
The ACA was, and continues to be, a highly contested piece of legislation,
enduring routine attempts at repeal and amendment (Rovner 2018, Collins et al. 2017).
Such ongoing debate induces considerable uncertainty about the future viability of the
ACA, rendering hospitals and physicians to carefully consider the most appropriate
manner with which to alter their operating behavior. Evidence exists to support the belief
that organizations will uniformly adapt to new industry regulation imposed by
policymakers (Shaffer 1995), yet the presence of environmental uncertainty raises the
possibility that organizations may differ in how they implement policy changes which are
unlikely to remain in effect (Li et al. 2017).
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With this in mind, this dissertation seeks to examine first, how hospitals weigh the
decision to invest in complying with industry policy which may not be applicable in the
future. More specifically, which factors in hospitals’ operating environments influence
the degree to which hospitals invest in complying with the ACA’s operational
performance mandates. To investigate this research question, a longitudinal study is
conducted which analyzes US hospital performance data across an eight year period.
Reliant upon existing research that informs the factors influencing adoption of public
policy, the empirical analysis tests the impact of both external institutional forces (Guler
et al. 2002, Joglekar et al. 2016), and forces internal to the firm (Berry and Berry 1992).
Relevant to the dichotomous operational performance domains imposed by the
passage of the ACA, prior healthcare operations research has demonstrated tradeoffs
between clinical and experiential quality (Senot et al. 2016, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012),
such that a focus on one performance domain may be disadvantageous to the other.
Following such evidence, this dissertation extends the analysis of the impact of hospitals
operating environments on investments to comply with legislative mandates to examine
differential impacts to each distinct performance domain.
Although the ACA and its associated programs primarily focused on establishing
a link between hospital operational performance and hospital reimbursement,
examinations of physician contracting structures indicates alignment between physician
and hospital reimbursement structures (SullivanCotter 2018, American Medical Group
Association 2017). That is, hospitals have restructured the contracts of the physicians in
their employ to mirror the reimbursement mechanisms provided to hospitals by the ACA.
While hospitals and physicians have traditionally been aligned in focusing their efforts on
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continuously improving clinical quality (Levinson et al. 2010), the addition of financial
incentives and public monitoring, both of which are proven to be effective methods for
altering individual behavior (Song et al. 2018, Tosi et al. 1997), has jointly induced
pressure on physicians to place an emphasis on patient satisfaction.
Although existing research is limited in its examination of the relationship
between incentivizing patient satisfaction and prescribing practices, some evidence exists
to suggest an association between patient satisfaction and the denial of patient requests
for prescriptions (Jerant et al. 2018, Calcaterra et al. 2017, Kelly et al. 2016). A more
thorough analysis of this relationship is particularly relevant given that patient pain
management is one of the domains incentivized within the focus on experiential quality.
With this in mind, and against the backdrop of the opioid epidemic underway in the US
(Scholl et al. 2019, Frazier et al. 2017), this dissertation next seeks to investigate the
impact of the ACA’s reimbursement program, the Value Based Purchasing (VBP)
program, on opioid prescribing rates in US hospitals. To investigate this research
question, a longitudinal study is conducted which analyzes the trends in opioid
prescribing rates amongst hospital based physicians before and after the implementation
of the VBP program.
Taken together, this dissertation examines the operational impacts to the US
hospital industry following the implementation of legislation which incentives hospitals
and physicians to improve clinical and experiential quality performance. Findings inform
the discussion on the effectiveness of industry policy implementation in the US
healthcare industry as well as its impacts to the operating behavior of hospitals and
physicians.
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CHAPTER 2
GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY AND RESPONSES FROM HOSPITALS
TO THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT LEGISLATION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 ushered in
sweeping changes to the United States healthcare industry. Grounded in the goal of
transforming the US healthcare industry from a fee-for-service to a pay-for-performance
environment (Werner et al. 2011), the ACA introduced a reimbursement program which
financially incentivized hospitals to improve both clinical and experiential quality.
Although hospitals have traditionally focused on continuously improving clinical quality
(Levinson et al. 2010), experiential quality was a newly introduced performance measure
(Groopman 2008) which required hospitals to undertake significant investments of
financial and human resources (Lynn et al. 2015, Merlino and Raman 2013).
Following passage of the ACA, the legislation has endured constant opposition
and multiple Congressional votes aimed at repealing or substantially amending the
foundational components of the law, including a Supreme Court review of the
constitutionality of the law along with a successful 2017 repeal of the ACA’s individual
insurance mandate (Rovner 2018, Collins et al. 2017). Given the considerable uncertainty
associated with the future viability of the ACA and recognizing that investments to
comply with industry policy are often nonrecoverable (Parkhe 1993), hospitals may be
concerned with investing significant levels of resources to comply with its operational
performance mandates. Such concerns are likely exacerbated by an ACA mechanism
4

which imposes financial penalties to hospitals for noncompliance with its operational
performance mandates.
Prior research examining the adoption of public policy establishes that adoption
rates are strongly influenced by both external institutional forces, such as federal
legislative pressure (Guler et al. 2002, Joglekar et al. 2016), and internal determinants,
such as regional political and social factors (Berry and Berry 1992). Evidence also exists
that organizations may differ in the degree to which they feel the need to implement
industry changes that are perceived as unlikely to remain in effect (Li et al. 2007). Given
these competing beliefs regarding which factors are most relevant to industry policy
adoption, particularly under environmental uncertainty, we set out to answer the
following research question: What are the characteristics of hospitals’ operating
environments that influence their likelihood to invest in complying with industry
mandates which may not remain in effect in the future?
In addition, prior healthcare operations research has found evidence of tradeoffs
between clinical and experiential quality (Senot et al. 2016, Chandrasekaran et al. 2012),
such that a focus on one may be detrimental to the other. Building upon evidence of this
tension between the two types of performance quality incentivized by the ACA, we also
seek to answer the following research question: Do the characteristics of hospitals’
operating environments differentially impact the likelihood to invest in complying with
the various types of performance mandated by industry policy?
To explore these questions, we analyzed performance data from 3,078 short stay
and critical access hospitals for the eight year period from 2007 – 2014. Our results
reveal that political support for the ACA in the area where a hospital operates influences
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the degree to which hospitals invest in complying with the ACA’s operational
performance mandates, but only for newly introduced performance metrics. Specifically,
hospitals operating in areas that support the ACA are more likely to invest in improving
their experiential quality scores than their peers operating in areas that do not support the
ACA. However, we find no impact of political support for the ACA on investments in
more traditional clinical quality performance metrics. We also find evidence of the
influence of hospitals’ competitive environments on both types of operational
performance. Post hoc testing further indicates the influence of ACA political support on
experiential quality performance rates of change over time, providing support for the
notion that hospitals are altering their rate of investments in compliance over time.
In examining these relationships, we contribute to the literature by establishing
the impact of firms’ operating environments on compliance with industry legislation. In
doing so, we provide evidence of firms seeking information from their political
environment for signals about how to respond to industry legislation. These findings have
implications for the effectiveness of legislative policy implemented without bipartisan
support, which may impact economic growth and quality improvement within industries.
Our findings also have implications for industry leaders such that limiting investment in
legislative mandates which are liable to change may free up resources to be invested in
alternative operational areas.
2.1 BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
2.1.1 Affordable Care Act Legislation and Hospital Performance
Since the ACA was signed into law in 2010, the healthcare industry has endured a
continuous period of flux and uncertainty (Becker’s Hospital Review 2013, Deloitte
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Center for Health Solutions 2017). The ACA was a non-bipartisan legislation, supported
and passed by the Democratic Party and strongly opposed by the Republican Party in the
United States (111th United States Congress 2009-2010). The strong opposition and
multiple calls to repeal the ACA introduced considerable uncertainty regarding the future
viability of the Act, especially in the event of a change in the political administration in
power. Since the passage of the ACA, opposition has included a 2012 Supreme Court
ruling to uphold its constitutionality, numerous Congressional votes aimed at repealing
the foundational tenets of the Act, and a successful repeal of the individual insurance
mandate in 2017.
The ACA included a directive to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) to establish a Hospital Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) Program under which
value-based incentive payments are made in a fiscal year to hospitals that meet specified
performance standards for both clinical quality of care and patient experience (111 th US
Congress - H.R.3590, Section 3001). Failure to meet specified performance targets is to
result in the withholding of Medicare reimbursement, effectively creating financial
penalties for underperforming hospitals.
The VBP program operationalized clinical quality through a metric known as
conformance quality (CQ), which measures a hospital’s adherence to evidence-based best
practices for patient care (Garvin 1987, Senot et al. 2016, Senot et al. 2016, Sharma et al.
2016). Research indicates that implementing these practices leads to improvements in
patient outcomes (Chassin et al. 2010). While hospitals have traditionally focused on
conformance quality (Levinson et al. 2010), patient experience is a relatively new
performance domain that has struggled to receive broad support from clinicians
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(Groopman 2008). Patient experience encompasses the quality of communication
between the patient and caregivers regarding care delivery, as well as the quality of the
ambiance and amenities provided during their hospital stay (Bechel et al. 2000). To
capture patient experience, also known as experiential quality (EQ), CMS relies on
results from the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems
(HCAHPS) survey.
Improving EQ is a challenging task for hospitals for several reasons. First,
improving EQ primarily depends on the commitment of front line service workers (i.e.
nurses and physicians) to patient communication and responsiveness (Levinson et al.
2010). Quantifying and identifying EQ improvement opportunities can also be difficult,
requiring extensive investment of financial and human resources by hospitals (Lynn et al.
2015, Merlino and Raman 2013). As an example, to improve EQ performance, the
Cleveland Clinic invested approximately $11 million to implement a mandatory training
program for all employees and instituted mandatory hourly nursing rounds to check on
patient needs (Merlino and Raman 2013).
Given the expenses and substantial cultural shift associated with improving EQ
performance, hospitals would likely prefer not to commit resources towards complying
with the EQ performance mandate until necessary. In the following sections, we consider
how various components of hospitals’ operating environments influence the decision to
invest in complying with operational performance mandates incentivized by the ACA.
2.1.2 Real Options and Legislative Uncertainty
Real options theory provides a framework for understanding how organizations
make commitments to strategic actions and allocate scarce resources (McGrath et al.
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2004). The value of real options is tied to information related to uncertainty in an
investment’s value. One option that can benefit organizations is the opportunity to delay,
or limit, investment, since deferring commitment of resources offers the strategic
flexibility of waiting until additional information can be incorporated into investment
decisions (Li et al. 2007). The decision to withhold investment is most valuable when
investment decisions are nonrecoverable and greatly reduce the value for alternative use
(Parkhe 1993).
In our context, we focus on uncertainty related to the ACA legislation, or
legislative uncertainty. We define legislative uncertainty as the lack of clarity that exists
regarding the future of legislation requiring compliance by hospitals. Legislative
uncertainty is important to hospitals’ real options value for three reasons. First, ACA
mandates impose costs of compliance on hospitals without corresponding direct positive
changes in cash flow. At the same time, ACA directives include penalties for
noncompliance. When costs of compliance outweigh penalties for noncompliance, it is
rational for hospitals to seek to delay complying with ACA mandates. Second, the degree
to which the future of ACA mandates is uncertain influences the expected cash outflows
for noncompliance. That is, when hospitals believe the ACA will be repealed, the
expected value of potential costs for noncompliance are reduced and the option to limit
compliance increases in value. Finally, investments in compliance represent an
opportunity cost, where scarce financial resources allocated to compliance trade off with
other investment options. If the ACA were to be repealed, hospitals could not revisit prior
compliance investment decisions to reallocate those resources to more productive uses,
rendering the costs of investing in compliance as nonrecoverable (Parkhe 1993).
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Building on the literature which investigates options under future uncertainty, we
suggest that hospitals operating in environments that support repeal of the ACA should
have a discounted value of noncompliance costs relative to compliance costs. As such,
we expect these hospitals to delay investments in compliance. In contrast, hospitals
operating in environments that support maintaining the ACA will not delay investments
in compliance. In the following section, we consider various factors in hospitals’
operating environments which influence investments in compliance with, and ultimately
performance on, ACA performance domains.
2.1.3 Political Support for Legislation
Due to a lack of bipartisan support for the ACA, and the divisive nature of
political sentiment in the US, the level of political support for the ACA in the area in
which a given hospital is located is likely to influence a hospital’s perception of the
legislation’s future and, relatedly, the degree to which the hospital invests in its
compliance with its performance directives. Consistent with this argument, researchers
studying adoptions of public policy argue that adoption rates are strongly influenced by
two factors: external institutional forces such as federal legislative pressures, and internal
determinants such as lower level political affiliation. Scholars further argue that there
could be potential adoption synergies or tensions between these factors depending on
whether there is alignment between these forces (Berry and Berry 1992). From an
external standpoint, financial penalties for noncompliance lead to institutional pressures
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Guler et al. 2002, Joglekar et al. 2016) which can influence
investments in initiatives to federal legislative directives. For example, healthcare studies
demonstrate that hospitals implement quality improvement initiatives, following
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legislation mandating public reporting on such metrics, even when they are not ready to
do so (Hibbard et al. 2003, Tu and Cameron 2003).
However, internal determinants of adoption based on more regional political and
social factors can also overpower external determinants (Berry and Berry 1992). For
instance, in a study of greenhouse gas reduction across 900 US cities, Krause (2011)
found that regional political characteristics had a strong association with local leaders’
decisions to sign a climate protection agreement. Such evidence suggests that regional
political characteristics may influence hospital decisions regarding compliance with a
federal policy. That is, when the political environment in the area where the hospital
operates supports the ACA, the hospital may suffer consequences if it fails to comply
with the ACA’s performance directives, decreasing the value of the option to limit
investment. Alternatively, when the political environment does not support the ACA, the
option to delay, or limit, investment in compliance is more valuable. Concisely, when a
hospital’s political environment suggests the ACA will remain in place, hospitals are
more likely to invest in complying with its performance mandates; however, when a
hospital’s political environment suggests the ACA will be repealed, hospitals are less
likely to invest in complying with its performance mandates.
As noted previously, the ACA mandated two distinct domains to measure hospital
operational quality performance (Young 2017). EQ is a recently introduced performance
domain in the hospital setting which mandates a focus on the interaction between
caregivers and patients, as viewed from the patient’s perspective (Chandrasekaran et al.
2012). Due to the considerable investment of financial and human resources required by
hospitals to shift their focus toward improvements in EQ (Lynn et al. 2015, Merlino and
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Raman 2013), hospitals may favor limiting their investments in EQ if their political
environment suggests that the legislation is likely to be repealed. Conversely, when a
hospital’s political environment suggests that the legislation will remain, hospitals have
no incentive to delay investments in EQ compliance.
In contrast, since hospitals have traditionally focused on CQ (Levinson et al.
2010) and evidence indicates that such practices lead to improvements in patient
outcomes (Chassin et al. 2010), hospitals should universally invest in improvements to
CQ. As such, the political environment within which a hospital operates should have no
impact on compliance with CQ performance mandates. Accordingly, we introduce the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Hospitals operating in states that support the ACA will have higher
experiential quality (EQ) performance.
Hypothesis 1b: State political support for the ACA will have no impact on hospital
conformance quality (CQ) performance.
2.1.4 Competition
A second important consideration in determining the value of limiting investment
in response to ACA mandates are the decisions of competitors to invest in compliance (Li
et al. 2007). In the healthcare setting, distance is an important consideration for patients
seeking medical care (Tay 2003). Thus, competition among hospitals is geographically
constrained. Competition is generally thought to promote investments in activities aimed
at achieving differentiation (Ocasio 1997). At the same time, it also creates a bandwagon
effect (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993), where firms imitate the actions of their
competitors. Failing to invest in legislative mandates may leave one hospital behind its
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competition, decreasing the value of the option to limit investment (Kester 1984). These
mechanisms in combination could influence investments to support legislative directives
within a competitive market.
Although research indicates that investments in quality that is easily observed and
understood by customers are likely to have a higher impact than improvements in
difficult to observe clinical metrics (Goldman and Romley 2008, Propper et al. 2007), the
ACA linked financial incentives (penalties) to both experiential and clinical quality
performance. Hence hospitals may financially suffer by limiting investment to comply
with legislative mandates on both types of quality metrics if their competition chooses to
do so. Further, the ACA commissioned public reporting of hospital performance scores,
providing hospitals with access to the performance of their local competitors. Given the
localized nature of competition in the healthcare sector and the availability of competitor
performance information, it is likely that hospitals will attempt to imitate competitor
actions related to both EQ and CQ performance. Thus, hospitals that face higher levels of
market competition will be more likely to invest in both performance domains mandated
by the ACA, leading to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Hospitals operating in highly competitive environments will have
higher experiential quality (EQ) performance.
Hypothesis 2b: Hospitals operating in highly competitive environments will have
higher conformance quality (CQ) performance.
2.1.5 Impact of Competition on the Relationship between Political Support for
Legislation and Hospital Performance
Perceptions of the future of the ACA are likely to bound the value of the option
hospitals can exercise in the face of competitor actions. Research notes that uncertainty
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has a discouraging effect on investments under less competitive pressure (Guiso and
Parigi 1999). As such, we suggest that high levels of competitor actions will overpower
the relationship between government ideology and hospital performance. The localized
nature of competition in healthcare creates the potential for significant financial losses if
patients migrate to hospitals with better performance. Therefore, competitive forces are
likely to lead hospitals to imitate competitor actions related to performance, regardless of
the political environment within which the hospital is operating. Hence, when
competitors invest in improving operational performance, the option to limit investment
decreases in value regardless of the prevailing political environment in which the hospital
operates.
Further, based on our prior arguments for H1b that the political environment in
which a hospital is operating will have no impact on compliance with CQ performance
mandates, we believe that competition will only influence the relationship between a
hospital’s political environment and its compliance with EQ performance mandates.
Accordingly, we introduce our final hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Competition attenuates the relationship between state political
support for the ACA and experiential quality (EQ), such that EQ will be greater
at higher levels of competition, regardless of state political support for the ACA.
Hypothesis 3b: Competition will not impact the relationship between state
political support for the ACA and conformance quality (CQ).

14

2.2 METHODS
2.2.1 Sample
We test our hypotheses by leveraging a unique, longitudinal dataset combining
state government ideology scores, Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare
Providers and Systems (HCAHPS) scores, CMS Cost Reports, and US Census data. The
unit of analysis in our study is the firm, more specifically, a hospital. We collected data
on short stay acute care and critical access hospitals for the eight year period from 2007 –
2014. To avoid biasing results with data from specialty hospitals with excessive average
length of stays and uniquely complex patient conditions, such as long term acute care or
rehabilitation hospitals, our sample population does not include these types of hospitals.
These hospitals also have significantly different operations compared to acute care
hospitals and are often not required to report or incur penalties based on EQ performance.
The hospitals included in our dataset are derived from all short term acute care hospitals
registered with Medicare, as reported by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.
Our final dataset contains up to 19,982 hospital–year observations for our dependent
variables.
2.2.2 Measures
The financial and human resources committed by a hospital to comply with ACA
performance mandates should be reflected in the relative improvement in a hospital’s
performance over time. Therefore, consistent with prior literature, we measure hospitals’
resource commitment and investments in complying with ACA performance mandates,
which are difficult to capture, in terms of the actual achievement on this performance
outcome (Hitt et al. 1991).
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Experiential quality: In this study, we measure experiential quality (EQ) based on scores
of an industrywide consumer assessment tool, the HCAHPS survey, which captures patient
beliefs about their interaction with providers during their inpatient hospital stay. The
measures selected to represent a hospital’s EQ reflect a consensus between healthcare
reporting agencies CMS and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and include
six questions related to provider communication and responsiveness to patient needs.
Specifically, the HCAHPS survey items that are averaged include, (1) How often did
doctors communicate well with patients? (2) How often did nurses communicate well with
patients? (3) How often did patients receive help quickly from hospital staff? (4) How often
did staff explain about medicines before giving them to patients? (5) How often was the
patient pain controlled? (6) Were patients given information about what to do during their
recovery at home? Consistent with prior literature, we invoke a logit transformation of a
hospital’s percentage score (Chandrasekaran et al. 2012, Sharma et al. 2016). Following
guidelines from CMS, a minimum of 300 completed HCAHPS surveys from each hospital
for a 12-month period was required to compute a hospital’s EQ, such that EQ for a hospital
i with a percentage score 𝑄 is calculated by,
𝐸𝑄 = 𝐿𝑛

𝑄
1−𝑄

Conformance Quality: Following prior literature, we measure conformance quality (CQ)
through a logit transformation (Collett 2003, Sharma et al. 2016) of the weighted average
Pi of the percentage compliance along four dimensions: Heart Attack (AMI), Heart Failure
(HF), Pneumonia (PN) and Surgical Care Improvement Project (SCIP). Following
guidelines from CMS, a sample of at least 25 eligible patients was required to compute a
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hospital’s CQ, such that CQ for a hospital i with a compliance percentage 𝑃 is calculated
by,
𝐶𝑄 = 𝐿𝑛

𝑃
1−𝑃

Government Ideology: Political support for the ACA is operationalized using a scale
adapted from political science (Berry et al. 2010), government ideology. The measure is
reflective of the ideological orientation of five key groups within each state government:
the governor and both major party delegations in the state’s Senate and House of
Representatives. The ideological position of each group is estimated using coordinates
derived from a comprehensive set of roll-call voting records of state legislators elected to
the United States Congress (Poole 1998). The ideological orientation of each group is
then weighted by the power each of these actors has over state policy decisions (Berry et
al. 1998). Unique to this measure is its ability to capture varying degrees of ideology
within a given political party (i.e. the ideology of one Republican-dominated state
legislature is not equal to the ideology of another Republican-dominated state
legislature).
Since the policy orientation of each group in state government changes slightly
from year to year, as does the performance of an organization, our study requires a time
variant measure of government ideology to accurately assess its longitudinal impact on
hospital performance. As such, the government ideology measure employed in this study
reflects changes in the policy orientation of elected officials between election cycles,
absorbing ideological nuances which would not be revealed through the utilization of a
static measure that only captures ideological beliefs at the onset of each elected official’s
term. The state government ideology scores employed in our study have been extensively
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validated against alternative measures of government ideology in prior literature. For a
complete description of measure validation, we refer readers to Berry et al. (2010).
Competition: The competition construct in our study is operationalized using a marketbased classification developed by the Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare 1, which establishes
that hospitals should be grouped not by traditional population metrics, such as the metro
statistical area defined by the United States Census, but instead by a collection of zip
codes whose Medicare residents receive the majority of their hospitalizations from the
hospitals in that area. This geographic area is defined as the Hospital Service Area (HSA)
in which a hospital conducts business. Although the numbers of hospitals included in a
specific HSA have changed over time (due to hospital consolidation and closures), the zip
code linkages composing each HSA have remained constant, enabling accurate
comparison of changes within each HSA over time.
After establishing the service area to which each hospital belongs, we
operationalize each hospital’s competition within its service area as the average EQ (CQ)
performance in that HSA. Since our dependent variable of interest is a hospital’s EQ
(CQ) performance, and because we are interested in the impact of a hospital’s direct
competitors’ performance on this outcome variable, we exclude each hospital’s own EQ
(CQ) performance score from our calculation of competition.
Covariates: Common in this research, we control for several hospital-specific factors
previously identified to influence hospital performance. Following the belief that larger

1

The data set forth at “Data by Region” of publication was obtained from The Dartmouth
Atlas, which is funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Dartmouth
Clinical and Translational Science Institute, under award number UL1TR001086 from
the National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences (NCATS) of the National
Institutes of Health (NIH).
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hospitals may affect resource utilization (Brown et al. 2003), we control for hospital size
by including the number of staffed beds as reported by CMS. The complexity of a
hospital’s patient mix may influence its operational performance; therefore, we
incorporate each hospital’s case mix index (CMI) to enable unbiased comparisons of
hospital performance among hospitals treating variable levels of patient complexity. We
also control for the average patient length of stay in each hospital in our dataset as
reported by CMS. Medical residents are at the onset of their medical careers and often
require more resources to facilitate their training and development as clinicians
(Grosskopf et al. 2001), which may compromise a hospital’s operational performance
(Sharma et al. 2016). As such, we control for the ratio of medical residents per licensed
hospital bed. We also include a continuous measure of a hospital’s Medicare payer mix to
control for the impact that this subset of patients may have on hospital performance.
To account for differences in hospital performance before and after the
introduction of the VBP program, which operationalized the performance mandates from
the ACA, we include a binary variable equal to 1 beginning in the year that VBP took
effect (2011). Since ideological and cultural beliefs vary by regions within the United
States, we control for regional differences in our model by including a dummy variable
for each of the four main region classifications in the United States: South, Northeast,
Midwest, and West. Lastly, we included a dummy variable for each year in our dataset to
account for time effects.
We present summary statistics for the key variables in our analysis in Table 2.1
below, followed by Pearson correlations (using pairwise deletion) in Table 2.2. These
statistics provide an initial assessment of our data’s validity, showing a significant
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correlation between government ideology and EQ performance (r = − 0.146, p<0.05). We
also see a positive and significant correlation between competition and hospital EQ (r =
0.892, p<0.05) and CQ (r = 0.882, p<0.05) performance, indicating that increased
competition leads hospitals to invest more heavily in improving both types of
performance. Each of the continuous independent variables in our models were centered
prior to analysis.
Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics
Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Experiential
quality (EQ)

0.938

0.255

− 0.936

3.664

Conformance
quality (CQ)
Government
ideology
Competition
(EQ)
Competition
(CQ)
Percent
Medicare

3.309

1.153

− 1.740

8.874

46.582

28.671

0.000

92.451

0.940

0.228

– 0.936

3.664

3.271

1.017

– 1.740

8.722

0.466

0.144

0.000

0.971

1.429

0.281

0.660

4.810

4.343

0.885

0.643

11.798

235.366

196.164

4.000

1928.000

0.062

0.155

0.000

1.996

Case mix
index (CMI)
Length of
stay (LOS)
Bed count
Resident to
bed
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Table 2.2 Pairwise Correlation Table
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1. EQ
2. CQ
3. Government
Ideology
4. Competition (EQ)
5. Competition (CQ)
6. Medicare pct
7. Case mix index
(CMI)
8. Length of stay
(LOS)
9. Bed count
10. Resident to bed
* p < 0.05

1
2
....1.000
...0.1790* ....1.000
− 0.1459*
...0.8916*
...0.1519*
...0.1380*

− 0.0841*
...0.1675*
...0.8815*
− 0.2775*

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

....1.000
− 0.1595* ....1.000
− 0.0841* ...0.1680* ....1.000
.0.0031 ...0.1537* − 0.2821* ...1.000

− 0.0779* ...0.3987* − 0.0262* − 0.1307* ...0.3542* − 0.3545* ..1.000
− 0.2831* .0.0059 ...0.0812* − 0.2294* ...0.0162* − 0.1126* 0.2824* ..1.000
− 0.2786* ...0.1583* ...0.0571* − 0.2592* ...0.1469* − 0.3072* 0.5709* 0.4863* ..1.000
− 0.1792* ...0.0634* ...0.1378* − 0.1776* ...0.0780* − 0.3454* 0.3544* 0.3435* 0.5025* ..1.000

2.2.3 Model Specification
We conduct our analysis using ordinary least squares panel regression with
clustering by hospital. When analyzing panel data in which observations are repeated for
the same hospital over time, adhering to the traditional linear regression assumption that
all standard errors are independently and identically distributed may lead to biased
results. To avoid such bias, we cluster standard errors by hospital to allow for correlation
of model errors for the same hospital in different time periods.
Prior to analysis, we examined our proposed set of control variables by employing
the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) method (Tibshirani 1996)
to avoid introducing unnecessary control variables into our model, which may lead to
model overfitting. LASSO involves a penalized regression, with each additional control
variable incurring a penalty based on the data structure. Regressor–specific penalty
loadings for the heteroskedastic and clustered cases are derived following the methods
described in Belloni et al. (2012). The LASSO procedure results provide statistical
validation of the control variables that we selected for inclusion in our model. Although
the LASSO procedure did not select hospital bed count and resident to bed ratio as
relevant controls, we continue to include them in our models to maintain consistency with
prior healthcare operations literature (Sharma et al. 2016, Brown et al. 2003). 2
We test our hypotheses using the regression equation below in which the
dependent variable 𝑌 , represents the EQ (CQ) performance for hospital 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝑋 , is
the covariate vector for the variables of interest – government ideology and competition,

2

Empirical results remain consistent with (or without) the inclusion of hospital bed count
and resident to bed ratio as additional control variables
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𝑍 , is a vector of control variables and 𝜀 , is the error term, with standard errors clustered
by N hospitals in our sample, where N equals up to 3,078 hospitals.
𝑌, = 𝑋 , 𝛽 + 𝑍 , 𝛾 + 𝜀 ,
where 𝐸 𝜀 𝜀

=

𝜎( ) 𝑖𝑓 𝑔 = 𝑔
;𝑔 = 1…N
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑔 ≠ 𝑔

The results for the main effects of government ideology on EQ (H1a) and CQ (H1b)
performance, along with the results for the main effects of competition on EQ (H2a) and
CQ (H2b) performance are presented in Table 2.3.
We further test the hypothesized interaction between government ideology and
competition on EQ (H3a) and CQ (H3b) performance by modifying the regression
equation to include the addition of an interaction term between these variables and report
these results in Table 2.4. Following hypothesis testing, we conduct several robustness
and post hoc tests to validate our findings.
2.3 RESULTS
Prior to reporting findings from tests for each of our hypotheses, we tested a
model with only control variables to establish a baseline of the variance explained by
control variables alone. These results are reported in Table 2.3 (Models 1 and 3). Table
2.3 (Models 2 and 4) also reports results for the hypothesized main effects of government
ideology on EQ (H1a) and CQ (H1b) performance. The results indicate that government
ideology has a positive impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.017) on hospital EQ
performance, lending support for H1a. This finding means that hospitals operating in
states that support the ACA (government ideology one standard deviation above the
mean) are associated with 12.3% higher EQ performance scores, on average, than
hospitals operating in states which do not support the ACA (government ideology one
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standard deviation below the mean). In contrast, results from Model 4 indicate that
government ideology has no significant impact (coefficient = − 0.001; p-value = 0.206)
on hospital CQ performance, supporting H1b.
Table 2.3 (Models 2 and 4) shows results for the hypothesized main effects of
competition on EQ (H2a) and CQ (H2b) performance. The results indicate that
competition has a positive impact (coefficient = 0.915; p-value = 0.000) on hospital EQ
performance, supporting H2a. This finding means that hospitals operating in highly
competitive areas (one standard deviation above the mean) are associated with 44%
higher EQ performance scores, on average, than hospitals operating in areas with low
competition (one standard deviation below the mean). Further, results from Model 4
indicate that competition has a positive impact (coefficient = 0.886; p-value = 0.000) on
hospital CQ performance, lending support for H2b. This finding means that hospitals
operating in highly competitive areas (one standard deviation above the mean) are
associated with 55% higher CQ performance scores, on average, than hospitals operating
in areas with low competition (one standard deviation below the mean). We also note that
integrating our variables of interest has substantially increased the variance explained in
our models, relative to baseline models with only control variables included.
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Table 2.3 Main Effects of Government Ideology and Competition on Hospital
Performance
DV = Experiential Quality (EQ)
Controls
only
(1)
Government
ideology
Competition
Value Based
Purchasing

Main
model
(2)
0.001**
(0.000)

DV = Conformance Quality (CQ)
Controls
only
(3)

0.915***
(0.010)

Main
model
(4)
− 0.001
(0.000)
0.886***
(0.008)

0.234***
(0.007)

0.011***
(0.004)

2.228***
(0.030)

0.322***
(0.025)

0.063*
(0.035)

− 0.018
(0.019)

− 0.113
(0.176)

0.117
(0.109)

0.081***
(0.019)

0.035**
(0.014)

0.464***
(0.103)

0.115**
(0.055)

– 0.014***
(0.004)

– 0.009***
(0.002)

– 0.065***
(0.016)

– 0.017
(0.004)

Bed count

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000*
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Resident to
bed

0.024
(0.062)

0.009
(0.050)

0.034
(0.201)

0.066
(0.151)

Observations
R2

19,982
0.136

19,982
0.797

19,571
0.323

19,571
0.746

Percent
Medicare
Case mix
index (CMI)
Length of stay
(LOS)

Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard errors (in parentheses)
clustered by hospital; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at
10%
The interaction results in Table 2.4 (Model 5) provide support for the moderating
impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.000) of competition on the relationship between
government ideology and hospital EQ performance, supporting H3a. In contrast, the
interaction results in Table 2.4 (Model 6) indicate no moderating impact (coefficient = −
0.001; p-value = 0.886) of competition on the relationship between government ideology
and hospital CQ performance, lending support for H3b. As shown by the interaction plot
in Figure 2.1, plotted over the range of one standard deviation above and below the mean,
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when hospitals are embedded within highly competitive service areas, there is a minimal
difference (about 1.4%) in the EQ scores of hospitals operating in states with low
government ideology (do not support the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states
with high government ideology (supported the ACA). When hospitals are embedded in
service areas with low competition, there is also a minimal difference (about 1.1%) in the
EQ scores of hospitals operating in states with low government ideology (do not support
the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states with high government ideology
(supported the ACA). Perhaps more importantly, hospitals operating in service areas with
high competition are always associated with superior EQ performance, regardless of the
level of support for the ACA, indicating that competitor responses to the legislation
dominate the effect of government ideology on hospital EQ.
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Table 2.4 Interaction of Government Ideology and Competition on
Hospital Performance
DV = Experiential
Quality (EQ)
(5)

DV = Conformance
Quality (CQ)
(6)

Government
ideology

0.001
(0.000)

− 0.001
(0.000)

Competition

0.919***
(0.010)

0.886***
(0.008)

Govt Ideology x
competition

0.001***
(0.000)

− 0.001
(0.000)

Value Based
Purchasing

0.012***
(0.004)

0.323***
(0.025)

− 0.022
(0.019)

0.118
(0.110)

Case mix index
(CMI)

0.036***
(0.014)

0.115**
(0.055)

Length of stay
(LOS)

– 0.008***
(0.002)

– 0.017
(0.011)

Bed count

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Resident to bed

0.009
(0.050)

0.066
(0.151)

Observations
R2

19,982
0.798

19,571
0.746

Percent Medicare

Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard
errors (in parentheses) clustered by hospital; *** Significant
at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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Figure 2.1 Interaction of Government Ideology and Competition on Experiential Quality
2.3.1 Post Hoc Testing
The VBP program, which operationalized the performance mandates
implemented by the ACA, went into effect in July 2011. Since the introduction of this
program marked the beginning of the penalty period for hospitals, we set out to
investigate whether the relationship between government ideology and hospital
performance differed before and after the start of this program. To empirically test this
hypothesis, we interacted government ideology and the binary VBP variable in our
regression equation and examined the impact on EQ (CQ) hospital performance. The
results of the post hoc test for EQ performance are reported in Table 2.5 (Model 7) and
provide support for the moderating impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.014) of the
VBP program on the relationship between government ideology and hospital EQ
performance. In contrast, the interaction results in Table 2.5 (Model 8) indicate no
moderating impact (coefficient = − 0.001; p-value = 0.683) of the VBP program on the
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relationship between government ideology and hospital CQ performance. As shown by
the interaction plot in Figure 2.2, plotted over the range of one standard deviation above
and below the mean, prior to the start of the VBP program, there is no significant
difference in the EQ scores of hospitals operating in states with low government ideology
(do not support the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states with high government
ideology (supported the ACA). However, after the start of the VBP program, hospitals
operating in states with high government ideology (supported the ACA) have higher EQ
scores than their peers operating in states with low government ideology (do not support
the ACA). This finding lends support to our main findings in that hospitals operating in
areas that support the ACA are more likely to invest in complying with the legislation’s
EQ performance mandates. The insignificant interaction term for the impact of the VBP
program on the relationship between government ideology and CQ performance further
validates our main findings in that hospitals appear to be investing equally in improving
CQ performance before and after the start of the VBP program, regardless of the level of
support for the ACA in their operating area.
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Table 2.5 Interaction of Government Ideology and Value Based
Purchasing on Hospital Performance
DV = Experiential
Quality (EQ)
(7)

DV = Conformance
Quality (CQ)
(8)

Government
ideology

0.001
(0.000)

− 0.001
(0.000)

Competition

0.916***
(0.010)

0.886***
(0.008)

Value Based
Purchasing

0.011***
(0.004)

0.323***
(0.025)

Govt Ideology x
VBP

0.001**
(0.000)

− 0.001
(0.000)

Percent Medicare

− 0.022
(0.019)

0.120
(0.111)

Case mix index
(CMI)

0.035***
(0.014)

0.115**
(0.055)

Length of stay
(LOS)

– 0.008***
(0.002)

– 0.017
(0.011)

Bed count

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Resident to bed

0.008
(0.050)

0.066
(0.151)

Observations
R2

19,982
0.797

19,571
0.746

Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard
errors (in parentheses) clustered by hospital; *** Significant at
1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
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Figure 2.2 Interaction of Government Ideology and Value Based Purchasing on
Experiential Quality
To further investigate how hospital EQ performance was changing after the start
of the VBP program, we conduct a post hoc test in which we re-operationalize our
dependent variable as the rate of change in EQ as compared to each hospital’s baseline
EQ (from 2007). In doing so, we are testing whether hospital EQ performance was
changing at a greater rate after (as opposed to before) the start of the VBP program. The
results of this post hoc test are reported in Table 2.6 (Model 9) and provide support for
the moderating impact (coefficient = 0.001; p-value = 0.014) of the VBP program on the
relationship between government ideology and hospital EQ performance rate change. As
shown by the interaction plot in Figure 2.3, plotted over the range of one standard
deviation above and below the mean, prior to the start of the VBP program, there is a
small difference in the EQ rate change of hospitals operating in states with low
government ideology (do not support the ACA) versus those hospitals operating in states
with high government ideology (supported the ACA). That is, hospitals operating in
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states that support the ACA have 4.3% higher EQ rate growth than their peers operating
in states that do not support the ACA. However, after the start of the VBP program,
hospitals operating in states that supported the ACA have even higher EQ rate growth
(about 9.5%) than their peers operating in states that do not support the ACA. This
finding lends support to our prior post hoc finding that hospitals operating in areas that
support the ACA are more likely to invest in complying with the legislation’s EQ
performance mandates, and appear to do so at a faster rate than their peers operating in
areas that do not support the ACA.

32

Table 2.6 Experiential Quality (EQ) Rate
Change
DV = Experiential Quality
(EQ) Rate Change
(9)
Government
ideology

0.000
(0.000)

Competition

0.906***
(0.013)

Value Based
Purchasing

0.015***
(0.005)

Govt Ideology x
VBP

0.001**
(0.000)

Percent Medicare

0.001
(0.000)

Case mix index
(CMI)

0.030*
(0.018)

Length of stay
(LOS)

– 0.009***
(0.002)

Bed count

0.000***
(0.000)

Resident to bed

0.027
(0.075)

Observations
R2

13,282
0.041

Model includes year and region fixed
effects; robust standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered by hospital;
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10%
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Figure 2.3 Interaction of Government Ideology and Value Based Purchasing on
Experiential Quality Rate of Change
Although elected state level legislators are the policymakers most involved with
drafting and voting on ACA legislation, we believe it prudent to investigate the potential
impact of political ideology at more granular levels. In other words, do political beliefs at
the county level in which hospitals operate induce a similar influence on hospital
operating performance. To empirically test this assumption, we replace the state-level
government ideology measure from our main analysis with a binary indicator of political
affiliation in the county in which a hospital resides. Since county level ideology is time
invariant, we run this post-hoc test as a panel regression with random effects. The results
in Table 2.7 (Model 10) provide no support (coefficient = 0.004; p-value = 0.298) for the
impact of local political ideology on hospital EQ performance. Further, the results
reported in Table 2.7 (Model 11) provide no support (coefficient = − 0.009; p-value =
0.602) for the impact of local ideology on CQ performance, validating our finding from
the test for H1b. Taken together, these findings indicate that hospitals are investing in
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ACA compliance related to EQ based on the political support for the legislation at the
state level, as opposed to the local level.
Table 2.7 Impact of Local Ideology on Hospital Performance
DV = Experiential
Quality (EQ)
(10)

DV = Conformance
Quality (CQ)
(11)

0.004
(0.004)

− 0.009
(0.017)

Competition

0.931***
(0.009)

0.889***
(0.008)

Value Based
Purchasing

0.003
(0.004)

0.270***
(0.022)

Percent Medicare

− 0.012
(0.014)

− 0.080
(0.066)

Case mix index
(CMI)

0.065***
(0.010)

0.402***
(0.045)

Length of stay
(LOS)

– 0.017***
(0.002)

– 0.025***
(0.009)

0.000***
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

Resident to bed

– 0.027
(0.020)

– 0.265***
(0.060)

Observations
R2

19,170
0.809

18,797
0.746

Local ideology

Bed count

Models include year and region fixed effects; robust standard
errors (in parentheses) clustered by hospital; *** Significant at
1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
2.3.2 Robustness Checks
The formula invoked for our operationalization of government ideology relies on
an estimate of the ideological position of each of the five key groups in state legislature,
which is itself derived from a comprehensive set of roll-call voting records of state
legislators elected to the United States Congress (Poole 1998). To further validate the use
of this operationalization, we replace our measure of government ideology with an
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alternative measure which substitutes roll-call voting records with interest-group ratings
calculated by the Americans for Democratic Action and the AFL-CIO Committee on
Political Education (Berry et al. 1998). The results presented for the hypothesized main
effects in Table 2.3 and interaction terms in Table 2.4 remain robust to this alternative
operationalization, validating our initial findings.
We also examine the impact of competition on hospital performance through an
alternative operationalization which replaces the average EQ (CQ) performance of
competitors in a hospital’s service area (HSA) with the average EQ (CQ) performance of
competitors in a larger geographic area, the hospital’s referral region (HRR). The main
effects of this alternative competition measure remain robust to those findings reported in
Table 2.3 (Models 2 and 4).
2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Legislative directives often require organizations to invest a substantial amount of
financial and human resources to comply with their mandates. Despite the prevalence of
such directives, and the degree to which they can reshape entire industries, little research
focuses on the factors within firms’ operating environments which influence their
compliance with legislative mandates. Leveraging real options theory and empirical data
from the US hospital industry, we examine how political support for the ACA legislation
in the area in which a hospital operates impacts its compliance with legislative mandates.
We find that, when a hospital’s political environment suggests the ACA will
remain in place, it decreases the value for hospitals to limit their investments to comply
with its operational performance directives. In contrast, when a hospital’s political
environment suggests the ACA will be repealed, hospitals are more likely to limit their
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investments to comply, with the expectation that the legislation will be amended or
repealed. This result is particularly true for newer performance metrics, namely
experiential quality, which require a significant investment of human and financial
resources. Our findings also indicate that competitor actions incentivize firms to comply
with legislative directives, for both new and traditional performance metrics.
Through examining these relationships, we contribute to the literature by
enhancing our understanding of the impact of firms’ operating environments on
compliance with industry legislation. More specifically, we illustrate that government
ideology in the area where a firm operates alters how the organization values the costs of
noncompliance, such that when the political environment suggests a certain future of
repeal or substantial amendment, firms find greater value in not complying with the
directives of the legislation. Instead, firms limit their investments in compliance for fear
of allocating finite resources to those areas of their business which may not be mandated
by legislation in the future.
In addition, we extend the literature on real options surrounding exogenous
shocks by identifying the concept of legislative uncertainty in influencing how
organizations responds to legislative directives. In doing so, we provide support for the
notion that firms look to their political environment for signals about how to respond to
macro-policy decisions. Finally, our study setting illustrates that options can contribute
value not only through generating future cash inflows, but also through avoiding cash
outflows to respond to compliance changes which may be altered in the future. Such
perceptions may lead firms to carefully consider investments to comply with tenuous
legislative directives, particularly when resources are finite, scarce and unable to be
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recouped in the future. Firms may instead prefer to invest their finite resources in areas of
their business with a historically demonstrated and more stable return on investment,
while concurrently hoping for an amendment or repeal of the legislation. Doing so may
lead firms to realize a future competitive advantage if the legislation is repealed and other
competitors have exhausted resources toward complying with mandates which no longer
exist.
2.4.1 Practice and Policy Implications
First, our results indicate that support for legislation in a firm’s political
environment has varying degrees of impact, dependent upon the type of performance.
Specifically, in the case of the ACA we find that government ideology had a significant
impact on EQ, a recently introduced performance metric, as compared to CQ, a more
traditional performance metric. This finding has implications on the design and rollout of
legislative policy. Given the increasing non-bipartisan nature of legislative actions,
compliance for legislative directives can be increased by building consensus amongst
industry stakeholders before rollout.
Second, our findings introduce questions about the impact that non-bipartisan
legislation may have on firms’ decisions and the relative degree of compliance with
legislative directives. Such concerns regarding the likelihood of firms to comply not only
apply in the short term, but also span across political administrations if governing power
shifts after the next popular election. Such swings in regulatory policy may lead to poor
economic investment decisions by firms, dampening economic growth and quality
improvement across entire industries. Finally, our findings have practical implications for
health system managers such that limiting investment in government policies which are
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liable to change (or may not exist) in the future may free up nonrecoverable resources to
be invested in other areas of firm operations.
2.4.2 Limitations and Conclusion
Our study has some limitations that should be considered in future research.
While we have taken steps to follow guidance from prior literature, the EQ measure
employed in our study is one of many ways to operationalize patient experience.
Although not the aim of this study, future research should examine multiple aspects of
experiential quality to validate consistency across measures. Additionally, the
government ideology construct available to us was measured at the state level. Although
broad scale legislative policy, such as the ACA, is most often created and implemented
by state and national legislators, future work may explore the nuances of more granular
levels of ideology, such as Congressional districts or census tract data, to determine if the
relationships between the constructs in our study hold at more concentrated levels of
geography. Finally, we are unable to directly measure the level of resources that hospitals
allocated toward improving both EQ and CQ in response to the ACA, and instead must
utilize the actual performance on these domains as a proxy for hospital investments.
Although performance has been used as a proxy for difficult to measure constructs in
other streams of literature (for example, Hitt et al. 1991), future work might explore
alternative operationalizations of the resource investment construct through survey data
or analysis of firm accounting statements.
In conclusion, our study provides empirical evidence of the impact of firms’
political environments on firm organizational performance following the introduction of
an exogenous legislative shock. Through an examination of the political and competitive
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environment within which a firm operates, we contribute to a more nuanced
understanding of how firms comply with legislative directives. Specifically, we leverage
real options theory and data from the U.S. hospital industry to illustrate that hospitals
differ in the degree to which they comply with ACA mandates based on the degree of
political support for the legislation in the area in which they operate.

40

CHAPTER 3
THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF HEALTH POLICY: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF OPIOID PRESCRIBING BEHAVIOR
“As a result of the consequences of the opioid crisis affecting our Nation, on this
date and after consultation with public health officials as necessary, I, Eric. D. Hargan,
Acting Secretary of Health and Human Services, pursuant to the authority vested in me
under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, do hereby determine that a public
health emergency exists nationwide.''
With this signed statement on October 26, 2017, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services officially declared the country's opioid epidemic to be a
national health emergency. This policy declaration follows statistics which indicate that
opioids were responsible for greater than 42,000 overdose deaths in the United States in
2016 (Scholl et al. 2019), while the latest projections from the United States Council of
Economic Advisers (2017) estimated the economic impact of the opioid epidemic in 2015
to be over $500 billion, equivalent to approximately 2.8% of U.S. GDP. Statistics such as
these quantify the negative health and economic outcomes of the opioid crisis, leading
researchers to investigate possible factors contributing to the societal consequences of the
opioid epidemic.
Underlying the overall death rate attributed to the general group of controlled
substances classified as opioids, recent research shows that over 40% of all opioid-related
deaths are attributable to prescription opioids, equating to upwards of 46 deaths per day
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(Scholl et al. 2019). Evidence also indicates that for each daily death attributable to an
opioid overdose, 30 non-fatal overdoses also occur (Frazier et al. 2017). Supporting these
statistical claims linking opioid overdose deaths to prescription opioids, researchers at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) have indicated that the increase in
opioid prescribing is among the principal factors contributing to the growing epidemic of
opioid addiction and abuse in the U.S. (Rudd et al. 2016). Opioid dependence often
begins when patients become addicted to opioids following receipt of a legal opioid
prescription from a licensed prescriber for a legitimate medical reason. Recent evidence
indicates that while supply-side interventions over the last decade have reduced the rate
at which legal prescriptions lead to opioid addiction, prescribed drugs, such as oxycodone
and hydrocodone, still constitute greater than 60% of opioid initiators (Cicero, Ellis and
Kasper 2017). That is, opioid prescriptions continue to serve as the principal gateway to
the growing epidemic of opioid addiction and abuse in the U.S. Recognizing the role of
opioid prescription rates in this crisis, and following direction from the President in April
2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services included reducing opioid
prescribing for pain management as one of the five priorities of its Opioid Strategy (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services 2018).
Prior research has examined the prevalence of controlled substance abuse and, in
particular, the role that prescribers play in this epidemic. Much of this research has
focused on the field of pain management and post-surgical care. As one example, a 2011
study of patients who received prescription narcotics for pain management following
urologic surgery concluded that 67% of patients had a surplus of medication in their
initial prescriptions (Bates et al. 2011). More recent studies have alluded to the role
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played by medical groups and policymakers in enabling, perhaps even encouraging, an
increase in opioid prescribing to manage patient pain. Clarke, Skoufalos, and Scranton
(2016), for example, identify the following events, which are widely believed to have
contributed to an increase in opioid prescribing. Beginning in 1995, the American Pain
Society advocated for clinicians to assess patient pain at every clinical assessment,
regardless of a patient's chief complaint; a campaign titled ``Pain: The Fifth Vital Sign''
(Campbell 1996). After further assessment and following recommendations from the
American Pain Society, in 1999, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations officially established pain as ``The Fifth Vital Sign'', elevating the
importance of patient pain assessment and management on par with the traditional vital
signs of heart rate, respiratory rate, blood pressure and body temperature (Walid et al.
2008). Finally, further establishing the importance of pain management among the
primary responsibilities of clinicians to their patients, in 2000, the largest integrated
health system in the United States, the Veterans Health Administration, also added pain
as ``The Fifth Vital Sign'' (Department of Veterans Affairs 2000). Despite the consensus
that pain is a critical health factor, unlike the four other vital signs, pain assessment is
predicated upon a complex and subjective process which requires substantial investment
of time and effort for diagnosis (Carr and Jacox 1997). Thus, including pain as a default
on a physician's patient checklist could significantly increase the time a physician needs
to spend with each patient.
Given that prior research has demonstrated a link between physicians, as
prescribers, and the opioid epidemic, we set out to investigate how a key operational
factor, namely prescribers’ workload, influences opioid prescribing behavior. In the
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operations management literature, workload has been shown to influence worker
behavior, leading to changes in service quality and speed (Tan and Nettesine 2014). More
specifically, in the healthcare operations literature, increasing physician workload is
shown to result in temporary improvements to patient throughput, yet prolonged periods
of high workload often lead to reductions in operational efficiency and adverse patient
health outcomes (Kc and Terwiesch 2009, 2012). Further, Powell et al. (2012)
demonstrate evidence that higher workloads not only compromise the speed and quality
at which physicians care for patients but may also have a detrimental impact on tasks
which require attention to detail. Building on this body of work and extending the
investigation of workload into an area of study with severe societal consequences, we set
out to examine how physician workload impacts opioid prescribing behavior.
The U.S. healthcare system has been plagued with capacity shortfalls (Kirch and
Petelle 2017), and new policies implemented under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA) have only exacerbated the supply imbalance. Access expansion, along
with rising clerical burdens and the introduction of stringent regulatory requirements
have increased the workload on physicians (Shanafelt et al. 2017), who were already
facing high burnout rates (Shanafelt et al. 2015). Higher physician utilization has been
linked to an increase in the cognitive load on physicians (Laxmisan et al. 2007). Prior
work in the field of psychology has shown evidence that increases to an individual’s
cognitive burden are attributed to time pressures which may induce individuals to alter
their typical work routines (Miller 1960, Zur and Breznitz 1981), through avoidance or
filtration of certain tasks. With higher workloads, physicians have less time to gather and
incorporate additional patient information into their clinical decision making. Tasks
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particularly susceptible to avoidance and filtration are those viewed by the decision
maker as subjective in nature. Patient pain assessment, because of the complex and
subjective nature of the task, is an onerous process necessitating a “social transaction
between caregiver and patient” (Carr and Jacox 1997). The subjective nature of the task
may motivate physicians with higher workloads to engage in avoidance or filtering,
rather than spending the time to complete a thorough assessment of patient pain. In fact,
prior studies have found some evidence of prescription rate increases for physicians with
a greater number of daily patient interactions (Davidson et al. 1994) and physicians with
shorter length patient visits (Tamblyn et al. 1997). These studies, however, focused on a
narrow range of patient populations with similar characteristics and did not examine
those drugs classified as opioids. In an effort to fill this gap in the literature, we explore
how physician workload impacts the prescribing rate of opioids across a medically and
geographically diverse population of prescribers and patients.
To examine the impact of prescriber workload on opioid prescribing rates, we
analyze 43 months of prescription data in the hospital setting from a state-governed
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP). PDMPs are electronic databases,
managed by each state, to track the prescribing and dispensing of controlled substances to
patients (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2017). Figure 3.1, which shows
opioid prescribing trends from our sample of hospital-based prescribers, indicates that
prescriber workload has a substantial impact on opioid prescribing behavior, such that
prescribers operating at high levels of workload (75th percentile) prescribe a significantly
higher level of opioids, on average, per prescription, than their peers with low levels of
workload (25th percentile).
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Figure 3.1 Opioid Prescription Rates by Prescriber Workload
Upon more detailed examination of the opioid prescribing trends resulting from
differential levels of prescriber workload, we noticed a decreasing trend in opioid
prescription rates (beginning with the start of our study period) which appears to level off
during the middle of 2011. In fact, the decreasing trend appears to not only terminate, but
even turn slightly positive around this time. This inflection point becomes even more
evident when plotting the mean opioid prescription rate over time, reflected in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2 Mean Opioid Prescription Rate by Month
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Having observed this trend change in opioid prescriptions rates in the middle of
2011, we turn our attention to macro-level environmental factors that may be associated
with such a shift. Following careful consideration and empirical testing of related macrolevel policy changes which may impact hospital operations 3, the event associated with
changes to hospital-based opioid prescribing was a policy change that took effect in July
2011, the implementation of the Value Based Purchasing (VBP) program. The VBP
program was among the foundational components of the ACA, passed by Congress and
signed into law by the President on March 23, 2010, with the goal of shifting healthcare
services from a fee-for-service structure to a pay-for-performance model (Werner et al.
2011). The VBP program operationalized this pay-for-performance environment in the
hospital setting by introducing publicly reported performance metrics focused on the
short-term health outcomes of patients, including a survey to assess how patients viewed
their hospital experience. Among the patient experience metrics are specific components
related to patients' assessment of how well their pain was managed by hospital providers.
The VBP program directly linked reimbursement payments of hospitals and physicians to
their performance on these metrics. 4
Prior literature has demonstrated that individual behavior can be altered through
incentive alignment and monitoring (Tosi, Katz and Gomez-Mejia 1997), and this

3

The authors conducted numerous empirical tests examining the potential impact of
alternative environmental and policy changes on hospital-based opioid prescribing. These
results, which indicate no significant impact of alternative events on opioid prescribing,
are reported in the Empirical Supplement.
4
Surveys of health systems and physician groups indicate that physician pay is
increasingly tied to organization level patient satisfaction and other value-based metrics
(American Medical Group Association 2017, SullivanCotter 2018), leading to alignment
between the reimbursement of hospitals and physicians in their employ.
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phenomenon has been validated in clinical settings (Staats et al. 2017, Song et al. 2019).
Jointly, these mechanisms of monitoring (e.g. public reporting) and incentive alignment
create pressure on hospitals and physicians to satisfy the short-term quality outcomes
(e.g. patients' subjective assessment of their care experience and pain management)
incentivized by VBP. Such pressure may induce higher levels of opioid prescribing by
physicians (to improve the likelihood that patients perceive a more positive experience
and better pain management), since denial of patient requests for pain medicine is
associated with lower patient satisfaction (Jerant et al. 2018). In fact, responding to
physician concerns, and despite a lack of empirical evidence with respect to the
association between VBP incentives and opioid prescribing, the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) has proposed future elimination of pain management questions
on patient surveys (Minemyer 2018). Our empirical findings indicate a positive and
statistically significant increase in opioid prescription rates immediately following the
onset of the initial VBP performance period in July 2011, followed by a significant
positive trend in opioid prescription rates in subsequent time periods, indicating that the
introduction of policy incentives focused on short-term quality outcomes are associated
with an increase in hospital-based opioid prescription rates.
If the shift in opioid prescribing trends is truly attributable to VBP, we would
anticipate that this effect is stronger in areas with more competition. Competition is
widely believed to encourage businesses to either differentiate themselves from other
competitors (Ocasio 1997) or engage in imitation (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993) to
reduce the degree of differentiation that a competitor currently possesses. It is also known
that medical outcomes that are easily observed and understood by patients are likely to
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have a higher impact on patient choice of medical provider. For example, Goldman and
Romley (2008) find that in highly competitive markets, patients are more likely to
favorably respond to improvements in observable metrics than improvements in difficult
to observe clinical metrics. Along similar lines, we argue that patients can easily discern
whether (or not) they received a prescription to manage their pain as well as the relative
volume (e.g. quantity of pills, days' supply) of the prescription received. If patients are
unhappy with the perceived manner in which a provider managed their pain, they may
not only be dissatisfied with the current care episode but may also migrate to other
providers who they perceive as being more responsive to their needs. In areas of high
competition, such migration is easier and may result in negative economic ramifications
for providers with departing patients, exerting added pressure on hospitals and physicians
to satisfy patient expectations for pain management. Thus, one indicator that should lend
support to our hypothesis that the implementation of VBP led to an increase in the rate of
opioid prescriptions is if the effect was stronger under conditions of higher competition,
since patient satisfaction results are publicly reported and may have a larger influence on
customer defections in areas where more choices are available. 5 We find that opioid
prescribing is amplified in areas of intense competition, such that in the pre-VBP period
areas of high competition experienced a slower decrease in opioid prescription rates,
while experiencing higher increases in opioid prescription rates following the
introduction of VBP.

5

Since public reporting of patient satisfaction scores is limited to hospitals, the study
sample is restricted to hospital-based physicians.
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Our findings contribute to literature and practice in several ways. Although prior
work has focused on the investigation of opioid specific policies on opioid prescribing
rates, to the best of our knowledge, no study has examined the impact of physician
workload or macro health policy changes on opioid prescription rates. Further, the current
body of literature provides only a partial understanding of the factors associated with
opioid prescribing while also lacking prescriptive operational insights which can
contribute to its reduction. Our study fills this gap by focusing on the role of recent
legislation aimed at improving the quality of healthcare services provided, while also
considering the operational and competitive environment where care is administered. In
doing so, we expand our understanding of the factors associated with opioid prescription
practices and offer insights on reducing opioid prescription rates, leading to actionable
solutions which can reduce the societal impact of the opioid epidemic underway in the
U.S.
3.1 METHODOLOGY
To study the impact of prescriber workload, the introduction of the VBP program,
and market competition on opioid prescribing rates, we compiled a data set of 43 months
of prescription data from a state-governed PDMP. The state selected for analysis in this
study is among the most populous in the United States and displays an opioid prescription
rate trend that is similar to other highly populous states. 6 Since our study is focused only
on the impact of opioid prescribing practices, we limit the data set to only those

6

Student t-tests between the opioid prescribing rate trend in our state versus the
remaining ten most populous states found no statistically significant difference for eight
of nine states. The ninth state is Florida, which has a significantly different age
demographic than the other eight states.
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controlled substance prescriptions that were written for substances classified as opioids
by the CDC, encompassing 13,269 distinct National Drug Code numbers (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention 2016). Further, because patient satisfaction surveys
(which inform the reimbursement incentives and penalties under the VBP program) are
only completed by patients following a qualified, overnight inpatient hospital stay
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services), we further restrict our empirical analysis
of opioid prescribing to only those prescriptions which were written by physicians that
provide care to patients in inpatient hospital settings (for example, hospitalists, critical
care medicine, surgeons7, etc.). Following data inclusion restrictions for opioid
prescriptions written by hospital-based prescribers, the final data set consisted of more
than 68,000 unique prescriber-month observations across our study period.
We begin our analysis by examining the underlying policy change (VBP), which
we believe is associated with the trend change seen in the middle of 2011 (Figure 3.2). To
do so, we divide our 43 month study period into two parts, in accordance with the
timeline shown in Figure 3.3. The pre-VBP period encompasses opioid prescriptions
written during the 18-month period from January 2010 through June 2011, the month
prior to the start of the initial VBP performance period. The initial VBP performance
period began in July 2011(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2017), in which
hospital performance at the start of this month was incorporated into hospitals'
reimbursement calculations. We delineate July 2013 as the final month for inclusion in
our analysis to avoid biasing our results with potential confounding effects from a second

7

To rule out any possibility that outpatient surgeries may be confounding our results, we
also ran our models by further restricting the data set to exclude surgeons. Empirical
findings remain consistent and are reported in Table 3.6 of the Empirical Supplement.
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policy change, Open Payments Reporting, which went into effect in August 2013 and
may also impact opioid prescribing rates. As such, we established the 25-month period
from July 2011 - July 2013 as the VBP performance period, where we analyze the impact
of VBP program implementation on opioid prescription rates, as compared to prescription
rates from the pre-VBP period.

Figure 3.3 Study Timeline
Since our research questions are related to how the VBP program, prescriber
workload, and the competitive environment are associated with changes in opioid
prescribing behavior, we are concerned with the average opioid prescription rates by
month across the prescribers in our data set. Complicating our ability to systematically
examine average opioid prescription rates across time are two issues: the unobservable
differences in prescribers (such as their medical training or clinical beliefs about the role
of opioids in managing patient pain) and the observable differences across the 13,269
unique drugs classified as opioids by the CDC (such as the relative strength of each drug
versus other opioids).
To account for the differences in individual prescribers, which are observed in
repeated observations over time within our data set (i.e. opioid prescriptions nested
within prescribers over time), we employ a fixed effects longitudinal model with
maximum likelihood estimation. The fixed effect longitudinal model (Hausman 1978,
Mundlak 1978) has many similarities to the piecewise hierarchical linear model
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(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) and the discontinuous growth model (Bliese and Lang
2016, Lang and Bliese 2009) in that it enables the researcher to test for the impact of an
event when data is available across a collection of individuals, both before and after an
event, and the outcome variable is thought to change at different rates before and after the
event in question. This modeling approach also has the benefit of controlling, through
prescriber fixed effects, for endogeneity due to pooling (i.e. multiple observations on
prescribers over time), and endogeneity due to time, through the introduction of multiple
time covariates to capture the change before, at, and after the event, which occurs
independent of the higher level entity (i.e. prescribers). Leveraging this empirical
strategy, we introduce three time related covariates as independent variables of interest in
our model: Time, which represents the pre-VBP slope trend; Transition, which reflects
the transition point at which the VBP program took effect; and Recovery, which captures
the post-VBP slope trend.
To account for the relative differences across the 13,269 drugs classified as
opioids, we employ a technique recommended by the CDC to convert prescriptions to
their respective morphine milligram equivalents (MME) (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2016). The conversion to an MME value incorporates the quantity of pills
prescribed (including refills), the strength of each pill, and an MME conversion factor
determined by the CDC. Operationalizing our outcome variable in this manner enables us
to capture the various ways in which a prescriber may increase the level of opioids
prescribed to a patient -- volume, strength, drug choice, drug form -- and accurately
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accounts for each on a common scale.8 Finally, we normalize our outcome variable by
dividing the total MME value prescribed (by a given prescriber in a given month) by the
number of opioid prescriptions written by the prescriber per month to arrive at the
average MME per prescription for each prescriber in each month of our data set.
To examine the moderating impact of prescriber workload and competition
present in the prescriber's geographic area, we introduce the following time variant
measures into our fixed effects longitudinal analysis. Workload is a normalized
continuous measure which captures the number of all controlled substance prescriptions
(not just opioids) written by a prescriber divided by the total days available in a given
month. This variable measures the relative patient demand and cognitive burden placed
on each prescriber in each month of the study period. Competition is a normalized
continuous variable which captures the relative level of access that patients have to
prescribers and is operationalized as the number of primary care and specialty physicians
per 100,000 census population in the service area. 9
Finally, we include several additional variables in our analysis to control for
market and prescriber-level characteristics. We include the number of Medicare
beneficiaries per 100,000 census population in the geographic service area to account for
the potential that older populations may receive more prescriptions than younger

8

The operationalization of our dependent variable builds on volume-based measures
utilized in prior literature (Levy, Paulozzi, Mack and Jones 2015, North, Crane, Ebbert,
and Tulledge-Scheitel 2018) while also incorporating research conducted by the CDC
that links small increases in MME values to heightened risks of opioid addiction and
overdose.
9
Value Based Purchasing legislation and competition are exogenous variables that occur
independent of the prescriber. Prescriber workload is susceptible to endogeneity so we
report results from an instrumental variable regression in Table 3.10 of the Empirical
Supplement, substantiating the validity of our main findings.
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populations. Further, because public interest in opioid addiction in the United States was
beginning to build during our study period, we included an interest trend in our model
which captures the relative public interest in opioids, operationalized as the Google
analytics trend for opioids in each month within our study period. Lastly, because the
type of patients treated by prescribers may influence the rate at which opioids are
prescribed, we control for all available patient-level characteristics in each prescribers'
patient population, including the average age of patients, the percentage of males and
females, and the percentage of various types of patient insurance treated by each
prescriber in each month.
3.2 RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results of our analysis indicate that, although opioid prescription rates
exhibited a consistent decline in the 18-month period leading up to the onset of the initial
VBP performance period, they exhibited a significant increase immediately following the
introduction of VBP legislation. This result is displayed by the plot of points from our
fixed effects longitudinal model in Figure 3.4, which normalizes the unexplainable
randomness of the actual values. More specifically, the average opioid prescription was
declining by approximately 9.5 MME’s per month from January 2010 through June 2011,
prior to the onset of the initial VBP performance period.10 That is, patients were receiving
less prescription opioids, on average, in each month during this 18-month pre-VBP
period. In the first month of the VBP performance period (July 2011), opioid
prescriptions immediately increased by approximately 39.5 MME’s per prescription,

10

Coefficients, standard errors and p-values for this analysis are reported in Model (2) in
Table 3.4 of the Empirical Supplement.
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negating more than four months of MME reductions seen in the pre-VBP period.
Throughout the remainder of the 25-month post-VBP implementation period, the average
opioid prescription grew slightly, by approximately 0.1 MME’s per month. In other
words, not only did opioid prescription rates experience a one-time increase immediately
following the start of the VBP performance period, but VBP is associated with reversing
the negative trend in opioid prescription rates experienced prior to the onset of VBP. 11

Figure 3.4 Impact of Value Based Purchasing Legislation on Opioid Prescription Rates
This finding supports our belief that VBP, with its focus on enhancing patients’
experiential quality of care, is associated with an increase in opioid prescription rates, a
phenomenon with long-term consequences to patient and societal health, which is at odds
with the fundamental aim of the ACA. The implication of this finding is that, while well

11

Fit statistics (i.e. R2, Log Likelihood, AIC and BIC) reported in Table 3.4 of the
Empirical Supplement indicate that the introduction of our time covariates, prescriber
workload and competition improve model fit over a base model with controls only.
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intentioned, the financial incentives of VBP created an agency problem which
encouraged prescribers to prioritize short-term outcomes, potentially at the expense of
long-term patient health. To remedy this hazard, future policy should incorporate a more
balanced approach in which providers are incentivized to achieve a more equitable
allocation of short and long-term health goals.
To explore the impact of prescriber workload (Figure 3.1), we modify the
longitudinal fixed effects model to incorporate the moderating impact of prescriber
workload. Results indicate that prescribers with higher workloads are, on average,
associated with higher opioid prescription rates across our entire study period, as
displayed in Figure 3.5. Specifically, during the pre-VBP period, prescribers with higher
workloads (75th percentile) are prescribing opioids that are approximately 20 MME’s per
prescription higher, on average, than their lower workload (25th percentile) peers. 12
Consistent with the finding in the main model (Figure 3.4), we find that opioid
prescriptions, on average, increased approximately 40 MME’s per prescription in the
month immediately following introduction of the VBP program (July 2011), regardless of
prescriber workload level. Finally, in the post-VBP period, prescribers with higher
workloads (75th percentile) are prescribing opioids that are approximately 16 MME’s per
prescription higher, on average, than their lower workload (25th percentile) peers.

12

Coefficients, standard errors and p-values for this analysis are reported in Model (3) in
Table 3.4 of the Empirical Supplement.
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Figure 3.5 Impact of Prescriber Workload on Opioid Prescription Rates
This result supports our belief that increased workloads are associated with time
pressures which compromise clinical information processing and increase reliance on
prior heuristics, leading to cognitive shortcuts and altered work routines which do not
incorporate all available clinical information into the pain management clinical decision
making process. The implication of this finding is that future health policy should
consider prescriber operational routines during large scale policy implementation. Going
forward, policymakers may consider prolonged program launch periods which enable
healthcare providers more time to adequately alter their work routines to adjust to new
performance expectations. Alternatively, new performance metrics could be
simultaneously introduced with the dissemination of “best practice” information so that
physicians are not forced to develop their own work routines to balance new expectations
with existing high workloads. Further, hospital managers can take steps to mitigate the
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impact of high workloads through flexible staffing and increased supplementary staff
support, such as medical technicians, medical assistants and contract staff.
Lastly, our findings show that prescribers practicing in geographic areas with high
levels of competition begin the study period with lower opioid prescription rates, on
average, but over time experience higher opioid prescription rates than their peers
practicing in less competitive areas, as shown in Figure 3.6. Specifically, during the preVBP period, prescribers practicing in areas with higher competition (75th percentile) are
prescribing opioid prescriptions that are initially 20 MME’s per prescription lower, on
average, than their peers practicing in areas with lower competition (25th percentile), yet
they surpass the opioid prescription rates of their peers in less competitive areas as the
VBP performance implementation period nears.13 Further supporting our finding from the
main model (Figure 3.4), opioid prescriptions, on average, immediately increased by
approximately 40 MME’s per prescription in the first month of the VBP performance
period (July 2011), regardless of the level of competition in the area where prescribers
practice. Lastly, in the post-VBP period, prescribers practicing in more competitive areas
(75th percentile) prescribed opioids that are approximately 3 MME’s per prescription
higher, on average, than their peers practicing in less competitive areas (25th percentile),
with this rate differential gradually increasing over time.

13

Coefficients, standard errors and p-values for this analysis are reported in Model (4) in
Table 3.4 of the Empirical Supplement.
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Figure 3.6 Impact of Competition on Opioid Prescription Rates
This finding supports our assertion that, following VBP, higher levels of
competition may lead to increased pressure on prescribers to satisfy patient expectations,
potentially to avoid migration of patients to alternative care providers which may be
perceived as more willing to yield to patient expectations. Interestingly, prescribers in
highly competitive areas appear to begin adjusting for the impact of VBP prior to the
actual transition, as evidenced by higher opioid prescription rates (than their peers in less
competitive areas) in the months leading up to the transition. The theoretical implication
of this finding is that the diffusion of practices, specifically through the imitation of
competitors, is strongest in regions with high levels of competition. Practically speaking,
while often believed to drive improvements in health outcomes (e.g. reduced cost,
improved clinical outcomes), competition can also induce negative ramifications to longterm patient outcomes. As such, policymakers should consider the potential consequences
of publicly reporting customer satisfaction surveys which focus solely on short-term
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metrics. One alternative may be to incorporate metrics which also account for patients'
satisfaction with longer term outcomes, appropriately balancing public reporting to
capture the short and long-term health interests of patients.
Taken together, our results inform the discussion on the connections among
workload, policy incentives, competition and opioid prescribing behavior within the U.S.
healthcare system. Our findings also provide prescriptive implications to hospital
managers, prescribers and policymakers about the relationship between operational,
legislative and competitive factors and opioid prescription rates, and their contributing
role to the opioid epidemic, in the U.S.
3.3 EMPIRICAL SUPPLEMENT
3.3.1 Variable Operationalization
The dependent variable in our study is an index composed of the average
morphine milligram equivalent (MME) per prescription prescribed by prescriber i in
month t. Because each distinct National Drug Code number assigned to each prescription
opioid varies in the drug type (e.g. buprenorphine, hydrocodone, oxycodone, etc.),
physical form (e.g. tablet, capsule, solution) and strength per unit (e.g. number of
milligrams), we followed guidelines established by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC 2016) to convert each opioid prescription in our data set to its
corresponding MME. This conversion allows for accurate comparison of all opioid
prescriptions (regardless of type, strength, or quantity of pills) on a standardized scale,
resulting in a continuous variable indicating the average relative strength and volume of
opioid prescriptions executed by each prescriber in each month of our data set, as
outlined in Equation 3.1.
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𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
∑[𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡 × #𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠 × # 𝑜𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 × 𝑀𝑀𝐸 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟]
=
[# 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠]
Equation 3.1 Opioid Prescription Rate Dependent Variable
Since our analysis is concerned with how the VBP legislative policy affects the
growth rate of opioid prescriptions, the independent variables of interest in our study are
three time related covariates: Time, Transition, and Recovery. The Time covariate
represents the initial time trend before the introduction of the VBP legislative policy
(January 2010 - June 2011). The Transition covariate represents the transition point at
which the VBP policy change occurred (July 2011). The Recovery covariate captures the
post-transition slope, in effect, the new time trend after the policy change (August 2011 July 2013). Through introducing all three time covariates simultaneously into our model,
we are able to accurately model the average opioid prescription rate for the prescribers in
our data set leading up to the implementation of VBP legislation (Time) and compare the
immediate change in opioid prescription rates following the introduction of VBP
(Transition), along with the trend in opioid prescription rates post-implementation
(Recovery), relative to the pre-policy trend.
Additional independent variables of interest in our analysis are prescriber
workload and the level of competition present in the prescriber's geographic area. Since a
prescriber's workload can be influenced by all patients that are seen (not just those
patients receiving an opioid prescription), we operationalize prescriber workload as the
total number of prescriptions available to us in our data set. Therefore, workload is a
normalized continuous measure representing the number of all controlled substance
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prescriptions written by prescriber i in month t, divided by the total days available in
month t (Equation 3.2).
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 =

∑[𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠]
𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ

Equation 3.2 Workload Variable
Competition is a normalized continuous variable representing the relative level of
access that patients have to prescribers, which we operationalize as the number of
primary care and specialty physicians per 100,000 census population in the geographic
service area where prescriber i is practicing in month t (Equation 3.3).
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

∑[𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠 + 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑦 𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑠]
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛

Equation 3.3 Competition Variable
Finally, as noted in Chapter 3.1 of the manuscript, we also include several control
variables in our analysis to account for market and prescriber-level characteristics which
may influence our dependent variable. A summary description of key model variables is
displayed in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.1 Description of Key Variables
Variable

Description

Type

Opioid
prescription
rate
Time

Monthly index (by prescriber) of
average MME per opioid
prescription
Time trend prior VBP

Dependent
(Continuous)

Transition

Transition point; equal to 0 prior to
VBP, equal to 1 after VBP
Recovery
Time trend after the introduction of
VBP
Workload
Volume of all controlled substance
prescriptions written by a prescriber
divided by total days in month
Competition
Primary care and specialty
physicians per 100,000 population
in service area
Medicare
Medicare beneficiaries per 100,000
population
population in service area
Public interest Relative level of public interest in
opioids (in month)
Average age
Average birth year of patients,
among all patients receiving any
controlled substance prescription
from prescriber (in month)
Percent
Percentage of female patients,
female
among all patients receiving any
controlled substance prescription
from prescriber (in month)
Percent
Percentage of patients with
Medicare
Medicare insurance, among all
patients receiving any controlled
substance prescription from
prescriber (in month)
Percent
Percentage of patients with
Medicaid
Medicaid insurance, among all
patients receiving any controlled
substance prescription from
prescriber (in month)
Percent
Percentage of patients with
commercial
commercial insurance, among all
patients receiving any controlled
substance prescription from
prescriber (in month)
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Level of
Analysis
Prescriber

Independent
(Continuous)
Independent
(Categorical)
Independent
(Continuous)
Independent
(Continuous)

Macro

Independent
(Continuous)

Market

Independent
(Continuous)
Independent
(Continuous)
Independent
(Continuous)

Market

Independent
(Continuous)

Prescriber

Independent
(Continuous)

Prescriber

Independent
(Continuous)

Prescriber

Independent
(Continuous)

Prescriber

Macro
Macro
Prescriber

Macro
Prescriber

3.3.2 Summary Statistics
We report summary statistics and correlation coefficients (with pairwise deletion)
for the data sample employed to test the impact of Value Based Purchasing legislation,
prescriber workload and competition on opioid prescribing rates in Tables 3.2 and 3.3,
respectively.
Table 3.2 Summary statistics
Mean
Std. Dev.
Opioid prescription rate
719.595
778.585
Time
21.334
12.413
Transition
0.591
0.492
Recovery
7.184
8.146
Workload
1.227
1.938
Competition
310.796
210.990
Medicare population
18854.740
12462.130
Public interest
31.141
5.200
Average age
1955.717
41.309
Percent female
0.548
0.281
Percent Medicare
0.065
0.146
Percent Medicaid
0.037
0.109
Percent Commercial
0.505
0.363
Observations = 68,150 physician-month observations
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Min
5
0
0
0
0.032
0
58
21
0
0
0
0
0

Max
5297.667
42
1
24
57.032
1432.847
62373
42
2012
1
1
1
1

Table 3.3 Pairwise Correlation Matrix
1
1. Opioid prescription
rate
2. Workload
3. Competition
4. Medicare population

2

3

4

5

6

9

10

0.258* ....1.000
− 0.023* − 0.078* ....1.000
0.011* − 0.014*

0.108* ....1.000

66

− 0.005.. − 0.002.. − 0.003..

0.000.. ....1.000

6. Average age

− 0.044*

0.016*

0.007..

0.002..

0.052* ....1.000

7. Percent female

− 0.031*

0.014* − 0.004..

0.013*

0.000..

8. Percent Medicare

0.095* − 0.010* − 0.028* − 0.004..

9. Percent Medicaid

− 0.008* − 0.025* − 0.030* − 0.023*

* p < 0.05

8

....1.000

5. Public Interest

10. Percent Commercial

7

0.023*

0.023*

0.000..

0.018*

0.032* ....1.000

0.125* − 0.077* − 0.012* ....1.000
0.059*

0.010* ....0.000

0.296* − 0.018*

− 0.004 ....1.000

0.030* − 0.072 − 0.063*

1.000

3.3.3 Results
Examining the impact of the Value Based Purchasing policy on opioid
prescription rates, we employ the following fixed effects model, reflected by Equation
3.4, in which 𝛾 represents the control variables listed in Table A.1 and 𝛼 represents
prescriber fixed effects.
𝑂𝑝𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒
= 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 + 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾 + 𝛼
+𝜀
Equation 3.4 Fixed Effects Empirical Model
In Table 3.4 we list the parameter coefficients for the fixed effects analysis of the
introduction of VBP legislation (2), the moderating impact of prescriber workload (3),
and the moderating impact of competition (4). We also list coefficients for a base model
(1) without our coefficients of interest included. The results of the fixed effects analysis
for the introduction of VBP (2) show a significant negative slope for the time trend prior
to the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = − 9.519, p-value = 0.000), indicating
that opioid prescription rates were consistently decreasing prior to the start of the initial
VBP performance period (July 2011). Further, the significant positive coefficient on the
transition point at the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = 49.089, p-value =
0.000) indicates an immediate increase in opioid prescription rates (i.e. increase in the
intercept) at the onset of the VBP performance period (July 2011). Lastly, the positive
and statistically significant recovery slope for the time trend after the introduction of
VBP legislation (coefficient = 9.606, p-value = 0.000) indicates a slight growth trend in
opioid prescription growth rates following the onset of the initial VBP performance
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period. Taken together, the results of the fixed effects analysis (2) indicate that the
introduction of VBP legislation is associated with an immediate increase in opioid
prescription rates, followed by a slight, but stable, growth trend. Further, our results show
that the VBP legislation is associated with reversing the prior decline in opioid
prescription rates seen before VBP legislation took effect.
The results of the fixed effects analysis in the prescriber workload moderated
model (3) follow a similar trend to that seen in the main model (2), albeit with differential
impacts of prescriber workload on the pre-VBP and post-VBP slope trends. For the
prescriber workload moderated model, high prescriber workload reflects a prescriber
operating at the 75th percentile of workload amongst all prescribers in our sample,
whereas low prescriber workload represents a prescriber operating at the 25th percentile
of workload. The results of the prescriber workload moderated model (3) suggest that,
although they begin the study period at higher opioid prescription rates, prescribers with a
higher workload experience a more negative slope for the time trend prior to the
introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = − 0.759, p-value = 0.007) than their peers
with low workload, indicating some convergence in prescription rates between the two
levels of workload leading up to the start of the initial VBP performance period (although
rates for high workload prescribers always remain higher). The insignificant interaction
between prescriber workload and the transition point at the introduction of VBP
legislation (coefficient = 5.488, p-value = 0.151) indicates that there is no statistically
significant difference in the increase seen between the two levels of workload (i.e. no
differential change in intercept), at the onset of the VBP performance period. Lastly, the
statistically significant positive coefficient for the interaction between prescriber
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workload and the recovery time trend after the introduction of VBP legislation
(coefficient = 0.661, p-value = 0.043) indicates a significantly higher slope trend in
opioid prescription rates for prescribers with a high workload, as opposed to their peers
with a low workload, following the onset of the initial VBP performance period. Taken
together, the results of the prescriber workload moderated model (3) indicate that, on
average, higher levels of prescriber workload are associated with higher opioid
prescription rates. Further, our results confirm the impact of the VBP legislation seen in
the main model (2), regardless of the level of prescriber workload, in which the VBP
legislation is associated with reversing the prior decline in opioid prescription rates seen
before VBP legislation took effect.
The results of the fixed effects analysis in the competition moderated model (4)
also follow a similar trend to that seen in the main model (2), albeit with differential
impacts of competition on the pre-VBP and post-VBP slope trends. For the competition
moderated model, high competition reflects geographic areas in which the volume of
total prescribers was at the 75th percentile amongst all geographic areas in our sample,
whereas low competition represents geographic areas in which the volume of total
prescribers was at the 25th percentile amongst all geographic areas in our sample. The
results of the competition moderated model suggest that, although they begin the study
period at lower opioid prescription rates, prescribers practicing in geographic areas with
high competition experience a less negative slope for the time trend prior to the
introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = 0.008, p-value = 0.001) than their peers
practicing in geographic areas with low competition, ultimately leading to higher average
opioid prescription rates for prescribers operating in highly competitive areas, even
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before the introduction of VBP legislation. The insignificant interaction between
competition and the transition point at the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient =
− 0.024, p-value = 0.474) indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in
the increase seen in opioid prescription rates between the two levels of competition (i.e.
no differential change in intercept), at the onset of the VBP performance period. Lastly,
the statistically significant negative coefficient for the interaction between competition
and the recovery time trend after the introduction of VBP legislation (coefficient = −
0.008, p-value = 0.005) indicates a significantly higher slope trend in opioid prescription
rates for prescribers practicing in areas with high levels of competition, as opposed to
their peers practicing in areas with low levels of competition, following the onset of the
initial VBP performance period. Taken together, the results of the competition moderated
model (4) indicate that, on average, higher levels of competition are associated with
higher opioid prescription rates. Further, our results confirm the impact of the VBP
legislation seen in the main model (2), regardless of the level of competition, in which the
VBP legislation is associated with reversing the prior decline in opioid prescription rates
seen before VBP legislation took effect.
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Table 3.4 Fixed Effects Model Coefficients
Base
Model

Introduction
of
VBP

(1)

(2)
– 9.519***
(0.512)
49.089***
(8.688)
9.606***
(0.681)
13.436***
(2.489)

Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload
Time x
Workload
Transition x
Workload
Recovery x
Workload
Competition
Time x
Competition
Transition x
Competition
Recovery x
Competition
Medicare
population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent
Medicare
Percent
Medicaid
Percent
Commercial

– 0.009
(0.020)

− 0.001*
(0.001)
− 2.232***
(0.351)
− 0.020
(0.043)
− 42.466***
(7.443)
110.980***
(13.121)
16.484
(17.325)
71.325***
(5.582)

− 0.001**
(0.001)
− 1.130***
(0.382)
0.018
(0.043)
− 43.137***
(7.418)
83.386***
(14.048)
– 29.415
(18.013)
36.227***
(7.247)
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Moderating
Impact of
Prescriber
Workload
(3)
− 8.565***
(0.622)
42.130***
(9.872)
8.783***
(0.791)
22.619***
(3.856)
− 0.759***
(0.283)
5.488
(3.825)
0.661**
(0.327)
– 0.009
(0.020)

Moderating
Impact of
Competition
(4)
− 12.073***
(0.906)
56.329***
(13.419)
12.062***
(1.111)
13.432***
(2.488)

− 0.114***
(0.031)
0.008***
(0.002)
− 0.024
(0.033)
− 0.008***
(0.003)
− 0.001**
− 0.001**
(0.001)
(0.001)
− 1.130*** − 1.123***
(0.382)
(0.382)
0.017
0.019
(0.043)
(0.043)
− 43.196*** − 43.026***
(7.417)
(7.417)
83.432***
83.021***
(14.047)
(14.048)
– 29.694*
– 30.252*
(18.013)
(18.013)
35.907***
35.844***
(7.248)
(7.246)

Observations
68,150
68,150
68,150
68,150
2
R
0.6973
0.6994
0.6994
0.6995
Log
− 509689.2
− 509451.5
− 509446.5 − 509439.3
Likelihood
AIC
1019394
1018929
1018925
1018911
BIC
1019467
1019048
1019071
1019057
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors in
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
3.3.4 Robustness Checks
Due to multiple changes occurring in the U.S. healthcare environment during our
study period, it is possible that the significant association between the implementation of
VBP and change in the rate of opioid prescribing could be due to alternative
environmental factors. To help rule out the possibility that other events are confounding
our findings, we conduct multiple “placebo” tests, or falsification tests (Nicolae et al.
2016), in which we select other time points in our study and statistically test whether
opioid prescription rates increased at these pseudo-transition points. In doing so, we are
attempting to rule out the argument that the VBP transition point was incorrectly
specified in our main model, thus leading to conclusions that are attributable to a false
positive. In our first placebo test, we selected a pseudo-transition point to test whether
other VBP related programs introduced in 2011 had a significant impact on opioid
prescribing rates. When choosing an appropriate 2011 pseudo-transition point to test, we
wanted to select a month which occurred prior to the transition point hypothesized in our
main analysis (July 2011), but also occurred far enough into the year such that it could
reasonably pick up the effects of environmental changes introduced in 2011, without
mistakenly capturing residual effects from 2010. The placebo test results for the selected
pseudo-transition point in April 2011 were not statistically significant (coefficient =
0.248, p-value = 0.976), lending support that other changes occurring in the U.S.
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healthcare environment in 2011 are not likely confounding the effects found in our main
analysis. Taking a different approach of selecting a pseudo-transition point, in which we
are not motivated by specific environmental changes, we chose to test the midpoint of the
post-VBP implementation period in our main analysis. The placebo test results for the
July 2012 pseudo-transition point were not statistically significant (coefficient = − 2.764;
p-value = 0.735), lending further support that our model is not incorrectly specified. As
another approach of selecting a pseudo-transition point, we wanted to isolate a feature of
the ACA which could practically lead to changes in hospital-based opioid prescribing
rates, particularly one related to the recent (at the time of our study period) emphasis
placed on electronic health records (EHR). As such, we test a time point that revolves
around the introduction of regulations surrounding EHR adoption and information
exchange, the first of which took effect in October 2012 (National Academy of Sciences
2014). Since EHRs were designed with the intention of reducing administrative burdens,
reducing medical errors and improving the quality of care, it is plausible that more
accurate and reliable storage and exchange of patient health information could lead to
changes in hospital-based opioid prescribing patterns. The placebo test results for this
October 2012 pseudo-transition point were not statistically significant (coefficient =
7.244, p-value = 0.371), indicating that the implementation of the EHR requirement did
not result in sudden changes to hospital-based opioid prescribing rates. We also
considered the impact that the expansion of insurance access, via insurance marketplaces,
may have induced on opioid prescribing. Open enrollment via Health Insurance
Marketplaces, however, did not begin until October 1, 2013, which was two months after
the end of our study period (National Academy of Sciences 2014). Therefore, although

73

we were unable to conduct a placebo test for this ACA initiative, any impact from this
initiative should not confound our findings since it occurred chronologically after our
study period. Taken together, these results provide support that our main analysis
findings are not attributable to incorrect model specification.
As noted in Chapter 3.1, there are several ways in which a physician could
increase the level of opioids prescribed to a patient in response to VBP legislation (e.g.
change in the type of opioid prescribed, increase in strength per pill, increase in quantity
of pills). The dependent variable in our main analysis, MME per prescription, accounts
not only for the differences across disparate types of opioids, but also incorporates the
strength of each pill prescribed and the total quantity of pills prescribed in each
prescription. To further explore the nuances of how prescribers are altering opioid
prescribing behavior in response to VBP legislation, we selected alternative dependent
variables which would provide insight into whether prescribers are increasing the
strength or quantity of opioids prescribed. To test whether strength increased following
the introduction of VBP legislation, we replaced our primary dependent variable, MME
per prescription, with an alternative operationalization, MME per day, which is
equivalent to the MME per prescription divided by the number of days of supply intended
for the prescription. Through normalizing the MME calculation by the prescriber's
intended length (i.e. days' supply) of the prescription, we can analyze whether the
strength of opioid prescriptions is increasing following the introduction of VBP. The
results of this test (reported in Table 3.5) are largely consistent with our main analysis
and confirm that the strength of opioid per day within a prescription was decreasing prior

74

to the introduction of VBP and increased immediately at the onset of VBP. 14 To test
whether the number of pills increased following the introduction of VBP legislation, we
replaced our primary dependent variable, MME per prescription, with the quantity of pills
prescribed per opioid prescription. Once again, the results of this test confirm the impact
of VBP found in our main analysis. Specifically, the quantity of pills per prescription was
decreasing in the time leading up to VBP and increased immediately at the onset of VBP.
Taken together, this robustness check confirms our main findings while also providing
statistical support that both the intended strength per day and overall quantity of pills per
prescription contributed to the increase in opioid prescription rates following VBP.

14

We note that the scale of the coefficients for each time covariate is smaller due to the
nature of the dependent variable, however, the directionality and significance remain
consistent with those reported for the main analysis.
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Table 3.5 Alternative Dependent Variables

Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload
Competition
Medicare population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent Medicare
Percent Medicaid
Percent Commercial

Strength per Day
(5)
– 0.518***
(0.031)
1.117**
(0.529)
0.492***
(0.042)
1.033***
(0.151)
0.001
(0.001)
− 0.000
(0.000)
0.002
(0.023)
− 0.000
(0.003)
− 2.697***
(0.452)
− 2.384***
(0.855)
− 4.503***
(1.096)
− 0.110
(0.441)

Quantity of Pills
(6)
– 0.062**
(0.025)
1.674***
(0.424)
0.009
(0.033)
0.154
(0.121)
0.001
(0.001)
− 0.000
(0.000)
− 0.017
(0.019)
0.001
(0.002)
− 1.432***
(0.362)
4.660***
(0.685)
0.436
(0.879)
0.752**
(0.353)

Observations
68,040
68,150
R2
0.3946
0.5730
Log Likelihood
− 318131.4
− 303594.7
AIC
636288.9
607215.5
BIC
636407.5
607334.2
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors in
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Due to the growing proportion of surgeries that are conducted in an outpatient
setting (Steiner et al. 2017), it is plausible that the surgeons included in our data set are
executing some of their prescriptions in an ambulatory setting. If this were the case, the
patients receiving these prescriptions would not be eligible to complete a patient
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satisfaction survey (because they did not qualify as a hospital inpatient), potentially
biasing our results. To rule out any possibility that prescriptions received by ambulatory
surgery patients are confounding our findings, we excluded all surgeons from our data set
and repeated our analysis. Results from this restricted data sample are presented in Table
3.6 and remain largely consistent with the findings in our main model. Although the scale
of coefficients and in some cases, level of statistical significance, vary slightly from the
main results in Table 3.4, the directionality and relative scale (when plotted) remain
consistent, thus confirming that our findings are not confounded by the possible presence
of ambulatory surgery patients in our data.
Table 3.6 Fixed Effects Model Coefficients - Excluding Surgeons
Introduction
of
VBP
Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload

(7)
– 12.636***
(1.214)
66.255***
(20.006)
12.727***
(1.601)
25.332***
(8.972)

Time x Workload
Transition x
Workload
Recovery x
Workload
Competition

– 0.029
(0.052)

Time x
Competition
Transition x
Competition
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Moderating
Impact of
Prescriber
Workload
(8)
− 11.650***
(1.451)
57.805**
(22.717)
11.654***
(1.844)
32.884***
(11.923)
− 0.900
(0.724)
7.556
(9.891)
0.985
(0.843)
– 0.030
(0.052)

Moderating
Impact of
Competition
(9)
− 15.904***
(2.166)
76.154**
(31.837)
16.148***
(2.663)
25.595***
(8.973)

− 0.158**
(0.077)
0.011*
(0.006)
− 0.032
(0.080)

Recovery x
Competition
Medicare
population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent Medicare
Percent Medicaid
Percent
Commercial

− 0.004***
(0.001)
− 1.718*
(0.909)
0.042
(0.094)
− 54.095***
(14.101)
99.936***
(25.326)
– 23.271
(34.875)
44.875***
(15.431)

− 0.004***
(0.001)
− 1.721*
(0.909)
0.041
(0.094)
− 54.131***
(14.101)
100.076***
(25.330)
– 23.441
(34.880)
44.562***
(15.442)

− 0.011
(0.007)
− 0.004***
(0.001)
− 1.708*
(0.909)
0.041
(0.094)
− 53.656***
(14.104)
99.708***
(25.329)
– 23.870
(34.875)
44.246***
(15.433)

Observations
24,739
24,739
24,739
R2
0.5775
0.5775
0.5776
Log Likelihood
− 193782.9
− 193782.1
− 193780.1
AIC
387591.8
387596.2
387592.2
BIC
387697.3
387726.1
387722
Models include fixed effects for 965 prescribers; standard errors in
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10%
Additionally, to further validate our findings, we tested for the impact of VBP
legislation in a group of prescribers which are not hospital based and thus do not have
their patient satisfaction scores publicly reported or tied to reimbursement. Therefore, this
population of prescribers should not have experienced changes in opioid prescribing
behavior associated with VBP legislation. To do so, we executed our main model on a
population of office-based prescribers from our study state which often conduct clinical
procedures in the office setting and may prescribe pain medication post-procedure -dermatologists. As displayed in model (10) of Table 3.7, all three time covariates for
dermatologists are not statistically significant, indicating that this group of prescribers did
not experience changes in opioid prescribing behavior associated with VBP. In model
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(11) of Table 3.7, we display results from another sample of office-based prescribers,
pediatricians. Although this group of office-based prescribers exhibits a statistically
significant negative opioid prescribing trend prior to the introduction of VBP, the VBP
transition point is not statistically significant (i.e. no intercept change), indicating that this
group of prescribers did not experience immediate changes in opioid prescribing
associated with VBP. We also apply our fixed effects longitudinal model to general
dentists, who also conduct procedures in an office-based setting and may prescribe pain
medication post-procedure. These results are displayed in model (12) in Table 3.7 and
confirm that VBP is not associated with an immediate significant impact on opioid
prescription rates. Although the initial Time trend and Recovery covariate for dentists
indicate significance, the magnitude of the coefficients relative to those in our main
analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4) is extremely low, indicating very little change in the
opioid prescription rate month over month. We also conducted this analysis on an
expanded population of dentists (not reported in Table 3.7) to include dental specialties
(for example, endodontics and periodontics), resulting in similar findings of no
immediate impact of VBP on opioid prescription rates.
Lastly, in model (13) of Table 3.7, we examine a group of prescribers practicing
in the hospital setting but which are not financially incentivized to place an emphasis on
patient satisfaction as a result of the VBP program. Recall that we excluded emergency
medicine physicians from our main analysis because patient satisfaction surveys (tied to
reimbursement) are not administered to patients discharged directly from the emergency
room. Notice that this sample of prescribers also experiences a statistically significant
negative opioid prescribing trend in the study period leading up to the introduction of the
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VBP program, however it is at a rate which is (approximately 95%) less than that
experienced by inpatient hospital-based prescribers in our main analysis (Model (2) in
Table 3.4). Further, although emergency medicine physicians experience a slight increase
in opioid prescribing behavior at the onset of the VBP program, it is markedly (greater
than 80%) less than that experienced by inpatient hospital-based prescribers in our main
analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4). It is important to note, however, that emergency
medicine physicians do not experience a prolonged increase in opioid prescribing after
the introduction of VBP, as the post-VBP recovery period is not statistically significant.
A possible explanation for this finding may be the influence of social and spatial
proximity on diffusion of prescribing practices between physicians in the same physical
setting (Angst et al. 2010). Combined, these findings provide support for our conclusion
that substantial changes in opioid prescribing associated with the introduction of the VBP
program are limited to prescribers practicing in inpatient hospital settings.
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Table 3.7 Alternative Specialty Prescribers

Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload
Competition
Medicare
population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent
Medicare
Percent
Medicaid
Percent
Commercial

Dermatology

Pediatrics

(10)

(11)

General
Dentists
(12)

– 1.822
(1.815)
− 27.185
(29.472)
1.924
(2.317)
142.948**
(61.509)
0.016
(0.085)
− 0.001
(0.003)
− 0.034
(1.378)
− 0.123
(0.088)
− 35.631**
(16.418)
− 82.320**
(38.782)
42.415
(53.739)
− 4.264***
(19.304)

– 4.667***
(1.674)
6.231
(27.854)
7.665***
(2.208)
71.482**
(18.370)
− 0.185**
(0.073)
− 0.002
(0.001)
0.623
(1.305)
− 0.146**
(0.067)
38.301***
(14.094)
264.565**
(55.030)
− 92.745***
(30.184)
− 22.731
(18.683)

– 0.549***
(0.188)
– 0.905
(2.990)
0.872***
(0.236)
0.913
(3.846)
− 0.001
(0.009)
0.000
(0.000)
− 0.006
(0.140)
− 0.004
(0.009)
1.264
(1.859)
18.584***
(5.986)
− 6.168
(5.863)
0.135
(2.019)

Emergency
Medicine
(13)
– 0.498**
(0.233)
8.489**
(3.941)
0.066
(0.307)
14.153***
(1.726)
− 0.006
(0.010)
0.000**
(0.000)
0.079
(0.172)
− 0.012
(0.017)
− 23.237***
(1.780)
22.212*
(11.432)
− 33.781***
(9.683)
14.224***
(3.852)

Observations
3,273
8,201
24,871
28,490
2
R
0.5665
0.5132
0.3369
0.4442
Log Likelihood
− 23627.5
− 62116
− 148450.3
− 177892.2
AIC
47280.9
124258
296926.6
355810.5
BIC
47630.2
124349.2
297032.2
355917.8
Model (10) includes fixed effects for 167 prescribers; Model (11) includes fixed
effects for 672 prescribers; Model (12) includes fixed effects for 944 prescribers;
Model (13) includes fixed effects for 814 prescribers; standard errors in
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
We also ran our models with an alternative operationalization of competition and
report these results in Table 3.8. We replaced our existing measure of competition, the
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total number of physicians per 100,000 census population in the service area, with the
total number of hospitals in the hospital service area (Dartmouth Atlas 2019). 15 Although
the scale of coefficients and in some cases, level of statistical significance, vary slightly
from the moderated coefficients in Table 3.4, results for this alternative
operationalization remain largely consistent with our main findings.
Table 3.8 Alternative Operationalization of Competition
Introduction of
VBP

Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload

(14)
– 9.192***
(0.811)
51.274***
(12.834)
9.093***
(1.064)
25.806**
(11.651)

Time x Workload
Transition x
Workload
Recovery x
Workload
Competition

1.986
(3.355)

Time x
Competition
Transition x
Competition
Recovery x
Competition

15

Moderating
Impact of
Prescriber
Workload
(15)
− 8.184***
(1.038)
44.451***
(14.750)
8.352***
(1.266)
37.227***
(14.257)
− 0.796*
(0.476)
5.426
(3.939)
0.585
(0.472)
2.000
(3.353)

Moderating
Impact of
Competition
(16)
− 10.367***
(1.033)
51.191**
(15.098)
10.913***
(1.287)
25.853***
(11.659)

− 1.306
(0.077)
0.329*
(0.173)
0.025
(2.303)
− 0.509**
(0.206)

The data set forth at time of publication was obtained from Dartmouth Atlas Data
website, which is funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Health Economics
Common Fund Program through an award [U-01 Supplement Award, National Institutes
of Health Common Fund (3U01AG046830-03S1)].
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Medicare
population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent Medicare
Percent Medicaid
Percent
Commercial

− 0.001*
(0.001)
− 1.139***
(0.367)
0.007
(0.041)
− 41.770***
(15.200)
101.898***
(30.878)
– 36.033
(28.757)
40.417***
(12.286)

− 0.001*
(0.001)
− 1.137***
(0.367)
0.005
(0.041)
− 41.905***
(15.204)
102.250***
(30.864)
– 36.412
(28.777)
40.087***
(12.296)

− 0.001***
(0.001)
− 1.138***
(0.367)
0.007
(0.041)
− 42.010***
(15.212)
101.928***
(30.873)
– 35.786
(28.794)
40.475***
(12.276)

Observations
66,181
66,181
66,181
Alternative operationalization of competition is time invariant, therefore
models in this table include random effects; clustered standard errors for
2,178 prescribers in parentheses;
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Disparate proportions of primary care versus specialty physicians in an area may
induce differential influence on the relationship between the competition present in an
area and opioid prescription rates. That is, it is possible that the effects of competition on
opioid prescription rates are driven more by the presence of primary care physicians as
opposed to specialty physicians, or vice versa. To investigate this possibility further, we
conduct a supplementary analysis to analyze whether the moderating impact of
competition on opioid prescription rates is driven by a specific type of competition
(primary care versus specialists) and present these results in Table 3.9. To do so, we
disaggregate the competition variable in the primary analysis such that competition is no
longer represented by one variable (representing all prescribers in a geographic area), but
instead is represented by two variables, one reflecting the volume of primary care
prescribers in a geographic area and the other representing the volume of specialty
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physicians in a geographic area. The results in the main model with disaggregated
competition (17) produce coefficients comparable to those in the main model (2)
previously reported in Table 3.4, indicating that splitting competition into two types has
no significant impact on the main findings for the introduction of VBP.
We then interact the level of primary care competition in a geographic area with
each of the time covariates in our model (18) to determine whether the moderating impact
of primary care competition is driving the results seen when we previously investigated
the moderating impact of total competition (Model (4) in Table 3.4) on opioid prescribing
rates. Results for the moderating impact of primary care competition in a geographic area
(18) are comparable to those produced when operationalizing competition as the total
competition in a geographic area (Model (4) in Table 3.4). Similarly, we also interact the
level of specialist competition in a geographic area with each of the time covariates in our
model (19) to determine whether the moderating impact of specialist competition is
driving the results seen when we previously investigated the moderating impact of total
competition (Model (4) in Table 3.4) on opioid prescribing rates. Results for the
moderating impact of specialist competition in a geographic area (19) are also
comparable to those produced when operationalizing competition as the total competition
in a geographic area (Model (4) in Table 3.4). Taken together, this finding indicates that
primary care and specialist competition in a geographic area are both contributing to the
overall moderating impact of competition on opioid prescription rates.
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Table 3.9 Disaggregated Competition Models

Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload
Primary Physician
Competition
Time x Primary
Competition
Transition x Primary
Competition
Recovery x Primary
Competition
Specialist Physician
Competition
Time x Specialist
Competition
Transition x Specialist
Competition
Recovery x Specialist
Competition
Medicare population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent Medicare
Percent Medicaid
Percent Commercial

VBP Introduction
with
Disaggregated
Competition
(17)
– 9.521***
(0.512)
49.159***
(8.688)
9.604***
(0.681)
13.444***
(2.489)
0.148
(0.102)

Moderating
Impact of Primary
Care Competition

– 0.066
(0.042)

(18)
− 12.629***
(1.088)
46.602***
(15.688)
12.791***
(1.313)
13.440***
(2.488)
− 0.299**
(0.136)
0.031***
(0.009)
0.022
(0.128)
− 0.031***
(0.011)
– 0.066
(0.042)

− 0.001*
(0.001)
− 1.123***
(0.382)
0.018
(0.043)
− 43.130***
(7.418)
83.400***
(14.048)
− 29.296
(18.013)
36.319***
(7.247)

− 0.001*
(0.001)
− 1.114***
(0.382)
0.019
(0.043)
− 42.994***
(7.416)
82.873***
(14.047)
− 31.021*
(18.014)
35.617***
(7.247)
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Moderating
Impact of
Specialist
Competition
(19)
− 11.724***
(0.830)
58.541***
(12.469)
11.649***
(1.026)
13.437***
(2.489)
0.147
(0.102)

− 0.194***
(0.051)
0.010***
(0.003)
− 0.045
(0.043)
− 0.010***
(0.004)
− 0.001*
(0.001)
− 1.117***
(0.382)
0.018
(0.043)
− 43.031***
(7.417)
83.116***
(14.048)
− 29.837*
(18.013)
36.023***
(7.247)

Observations
68,150
68,150
68,150
2
R
0.6994
0.6995
0.6995
Log Likelihood
− 509450.3
− 509433.8
− 509439.9
AIC
1018929
1018902
1018914
BIC
1019056
1019057
1019069
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors in parentheses;
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
Although VBP legislation and competition are exogenous variables that occur
independent of the prescriber, we recognize that prescriber workload is susceptible to
endogeneity concerns. Therefore, we conduct a series of instrumental variable regressions
(results reported in Table 3.10) in which we instrument prescriber workload using both
external and generated instruments. In Model (20), we use a lagged measure of prescriber
workload as our external instrument, resulting in findings that are consistent in
directionality, statistical significance, and magnitude with the findings reported in our
main analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4). We also conduct post-estimation statistical tests
for overidentification, underidentification, and weak identification, with each test
validating that we have selected an appropriate instrumental variable. As added
robustness, we also ran an instrumental variable regression combining the use of our
selected external instrument with instruments generated following Lewbel's method
(Baum and Schaffer 2012), with results reported in Model (21) of Table 3.10. These
findings are consistent in directionality and statistical significance with the findings
reported in our main analysis (Model (2) in Table 3.4) albeit with some differences in
magnitude of the coefficients. Once again, we conducted post-estimation statistical tests
for overidentification, underidentification, and weak identification, with each test
validating that we have selected appropriate instrumental variables. We note that slight
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discrepancies in sample size exist between these models and our main model (Model (2)
in Table 3.4) due to differences in estimation techniques and the incorporation of a
lagged variable (which is not available for all prescribers in our dataset). As further
assurance that the presence of the workload variable is not inappropriately biasing our
findings related to the impact of the VBP program, we have also run our main model
without the inclusion of the workload variable; empirical results for the three time
covariates remain consistent in statistical significance, directionality, and magnitude with
those previously reported. Taken together, these findings lend support that our main
findings are robust to potential endogeneity related to prescriber workload.
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Table 3.10 Instrumental Variable Regression Models

Time
Transition
Recovery
Workload
Competition
Medicare population
Public interest
Average age
Percent female
Percent Medicare
Percent Medicaid
Percent Commercial

External
Instruments
(20)
– 10.579***
(0.539)
55.650***
(8.612)
10.664***
(0.708)
19.003***
(3.138)
− 0.011
(0.020)
− 0.001
(0.001)
− 1.022***
(0.372)
− 0.029
(0.047)
− 43.887***
(8.076)
61.109***
(15.042)
− 51.645***
(19.289)
38.464***
(7.433)

Generated and
External Instruments
(21)
– 9.208***
(0.959)
120.375***
(14.594)
4.332***
(1.213)
104.709***
(1.530)
− 0.004
(0.014)
0.001***
(0.000)
− 0.811
(0.667)
− 0.876***
(0.081)
− 112.314***
(11.231)
622.327***
(23.141)
21.746
(30.241)
71.935***
(10.724)

Observations
61,145
61,211
2
R
0.0117
0.5188
Models include fixed effects for 2,242 prescribers; standard errors
in parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%;
* significant at 10%
Lastly, in an effort to examine whether the VBP program had a similar effect on
opioid prescribing rates in other geographic areas (beyond the state selected for our main
analysis) we acquired and analyzed data from an additional state PDMP, from a
substantially different region of the U.S. than our primary sample. We note that state
PDMPs have disparate laws and regulations with respect to data sharing for researchers.
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As a result, data acquired from this additional state did not enable for direct matching of
variables with the data source used in the main analysis and also required that we
examine a broader population of prescribers (aggregate samples of hospital-based and
office-based prescribers). However, we were able to recreate the three time covariates of
interest to match the new sample with our primary sample. Results for the time covariate
comparison between these two samples are presented in Table 3.11 and indicate that the
introduction of the VBP program is associated with similar changes in opioid prescribing
across both samples.16
Table 3.11 Fixed Effects Model Coefficients – State Comparison

Time
Transition
Recovery
Average age

Main Analysis
(22)
– 5.689***
(0.073)
12.965***
(1.010)
6.997***
(0.086)
− 0.039***
(0.004)

Additional Analysis
(21)
– 10.032***
(0.184)
31.249***
(2.476)
11.385***
(0.219)
3.064**
(0.069)

Observations
3,351,440
636,372
R2
0.7758
0.7418
Model (22) include fixed effects for 154,717 prescribers; Model (23)
include fixed effects for 69,390 prescribers; standard errors in
parentheses; *** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant
at 10%

16

When combined with the analysis referenced in Footnote 4, the authors empirically
validated statistically similar opioid prescribing trends for approximately 20% of states in
the U.S.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates the impact of operational performance incentive
programs, implemented under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of
2010, on the operating responses of hospitals and physicians. The ACA launched a
significant transformation in the US healthcare industry through the shift from a fee-forservice to a pay-for-performance environment (Werner et al. 2011). This reformed
service and reimbursement model encouraged hospitals to invest a significant amount of
financial and human resources to meet new standards related to clinical and experiential
quality (Merlino and Raman 2013).
Leveraging a longitudinal investigation of hospitals’ operating environments, this
dissertation reveals specific factors which influence the degree to which hospitals invest
in compliance with the new operational performance standards mandated by the ACA.
Findings indicate that political support for the ACA in the area where a hospital operates
renders a hospital more likely to invest in complying with performance measures related
to experiential quality, and that this investment appears to occur at a faster rate than
hospitals operating in areas that do not express political support for the ACA.
Interestingly, the role of political support for the ACA is only relevant for the nontraditional measure of experiential quality, as political support for the ACA is not
relevant hospital investments to comply with the traditional measure of clinical quality.
Findings also provide evidence of the substantial influence of competitor actions on
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hospitals’ likelihood to invest in complying with both experiential and clinical quality
measures. Further, the relationship between political support for the ACA and
experiential quality is dominated by high levels of competitor action, supporting the
notion that hospitals view competitor actions as more salient than the level of political
support for the ACA in their operating environments.
Motivated by the ACA’s focus on experiential quality and the severity of the
opioid epidemic in progress in the US, this dissertation also examines the impact of
financially incentivizing hospitals and physicians to improve experiential quality, and the
unintended impact on opioid prescribing rates. Findings indicate that hospital-based
opioid prescribing rates significantly increased following the introduction of the Value
Based Purchasing (VBP) program, which was the operational mechanism linking hospital
and physician reimbursement to experiential quality performance. Empirical findings
further reveal that the increase in opioid prescribing rates associated with VBP are
exacerbated by high levels of market competition and prescriber workload.
Taken together, the findings from this dissertation provide considerable support
for the significant influence of several factors within hospital and physician operating
environments, and their joint impact on the operational responses of hospitals and
physicians to the ACA. This dissertation informs the discussion on the relative
effectiveness of ACA implementation in the US healthcare industry as well as its
intersection with the ongoing operations of hospitals and physicians.
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